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Abstract 
Essays on Roles of Directors in Corporate Governance 
Jiao Ji 
2016 
 
The three chapters in the thesis provide some innovative explanations and perspectives 
regarding the role of directors, particularly, independent directors in a transaction market – 
China and in a developed market- UK. 
 
 In “CEO Dismissal, Compensation and Topics of Board Meetings: The Case of China”, I 
provide a better understanding of how board activity affects board effectiveness in linking CEO 
compensation/dismissal to firm performance. There are six major topics discussed in board 
meetings.  Our results show that turnover-performance sensitivity is weaker when there is a 
higher frequency of board meetings discussing the nomination of directors and top 
management. Moreover, the link between CEO compensation and firm performance is 
enhanced only when directors meet more often to discuss growth strategies for the use of IPO 
proceeds, investment and acquisitions. These sensitivities are not influenced by meeting 
frequency of other topics. It also sheds lights on how board monitoring of different decisions 
at board meetings modifies the connection between CEO interests and firm performance, then 
affect the quality of corporate governance.  
 
 In “Auditor Change and Corporate Governance: Audit Committee Reputation”, I provide a 
new empirical evidence that reputation is a strong incentive to independent directors to work 
diligently. I select audit committee in the UK as the study object because their roles on board 
 2 
are well-defined and the reputation cost for audit committee member is larger than that for 
other directors. Firstly, this chapter shows that the probability of auditor change increases with 
the proportion of reputable members. Second, reputable members tend to switch an auditor 
which offers a high audit quality, measured by better brand-name, bigger size, and higher 
independence. This chapter further shows that the reduce discretionary accruals, a proxy for 
earnings management, only follows an audit change driven/approved by audit committee, 
rather than involuntary auditor change (market shock). 
 
 In “The Hidden Information Content: Evidence from the Tone of Independent Director 
Reports”, I utilise a Naïve Bayesian machine learning algorithm combining with the Chinese 
word segmentation to inspect the information content (the tone) of independent director report, 
a unique disclosure of independent director. This chapter firstly examines the determinants of 
a report tone, firms with younger independent directors, more directors with accounting 
expertise, more board committees, more board meetings, less leverage, and controlled by 
private shareholders tend to have more positive IDRs. The chapter further tests whether the 
tone in the report has predict power to the future performance given that the tone of reports is 
based on director’s overall satisfactions of the firm. The average tone of the IDRs is positively 
associated with future firm performance after controlling other factors that influence firm 
performance. Moreover, the negative tone of IDRs is negatively correlated with firm 
performance for firms with greater monitoring necessities.  
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Chapter one: Introduction 
Interests in corporate governance have grown rapidly in academia and among the business 
community, the media, regulators, and the general public with financial scandals, financial 
crisis and news about excessive executive pay. Consequently, much of the recent discussion 
has focused on how to improve corporate governance systems broadly to avoid similar 
problems and issues. In the academic world, the interest in corporate governance has been 
interdisciplinary. Studies are carried out by scholars in Law, Economics, Finance, Accounting, 
and Management. 
 The aim of this chapter is to clarify the theoretical framework for corporate governance 
research in finance. The theoretical framework is the guidance for my thesis and my future 
research in this areas. It primarily includes two parts: review corporate governance in finance 
around the world and highlight corporate governance costs that are unique to China. Last, this 
chapter also summaries findings and contributions of my thesis. 
 
1.1 Corporate Governance across the World 
Stock-exchange listed firms exists across the world. In this types of firms, shares are not only 
the ownership certificates and have voting rights. Shareholders who have voting rights can vote 
in the annual general shareholders meetings and influence the appointment of board of directors. 
Board of director is essential and ultimate governance device in the corporations. Particular 
non-executive directors are principally in charge of monitoring the top management (including 
executive directors). 
 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
There are multiple definitions of corporate governance basically relying on the chosen 
objective of the company. The objective of a company is influenced by a counties culture, law 
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and instructional environments. The key question for deciding corporation objective is whose 
company the corporation is. There are two typical definitions. Based on believes that corporate 
goal is to maximise the return of shareholders such as in the UK and US, corporate governance 
is ‘the system of controls, regulations, and incentives designed to minimise agency costs 
between managers and investors and prevent corporate fraud’ (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009). On 
the other hand, most other countries such France, Germany and Japan have the view that listed 
firms belong to all stakeholders. The more appropriate definition of corporate governance is ‘a 
system is the combination of mechanisms which ensure that the management runs the firm for 
the benefit of one or several stakeholders (principles)’(e.g. Goergen and Rennenoog, 2006). 
Stakeholders may include all parties that have business relationship with listed firms, for 
example, shareholders, creditors, suppliers, consumers and employees. 
 Corporate Governance Theory in Finance – Agency Theory  
The classical theoretical model of corporate governance is the principal-agent theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). When the interest conflicts exists between agents and principals, the 
agent may not carry out duties agreed with principals in the best interest of principals, and 
favour to do self-interest activities. It normally refers to moral hazard in economics 
(Holmstrom, 1979). Complete contract may be a possible approach to mitigate principal and 
agent issue. However, contracts are impossible to complete due to practice issues (Hart, 1995). 
These issues contains that impossible predictions about all future contingencies, endless 
contracting, no efficient reinforce institutions, and more importantly, impossible to entirely 
monitoring agent’ duty due to information asymmetry. Agency costs have three components: 
monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by the agent, and the residual loss due to 
agent’s self-interest behaviour. 
 Classical Agency problems and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders 
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Based on Berle-Means (1932) premise that as firms grows, corporations will be run by 
professional managers who have little/ no shares on behalf of the shareholder. There are two 
classical types of agency problems based on sources of financing. First type of problems is 
between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals), chiefly perks, free cash flow problem, 
and management entrenchment. Perks denotes unreasonable on-position-consumptions by 
managers (e.g. (Yermack, 1996). Free cash flow problem means that managers increase the 
firm size by investing in negative net present value projects that may harm firm value. 
Manger’s increase firm size merely to increase their own power, social status and managerial 
compensation that often corresponding to firm size. Managerial entrenchment means that 
managers shield themselves from hostile takeovers and internal disciplinary actions.   
 Second type of agency problem is between debt holders and shareholders. This problem 
incurs when a firm only have very little equity financing, so the shareholders will invest in 
high-risk project. When the project successes, the massive pay off will go to shareholders; 
while when the project fails, the massive loss goes to debt holders. The agency costs between 
debt holder and equity holder decrease with the share of equity holding, while ones between 
management and equity holder increase with the share of equity holding. Therefore, the total 
agency costs has is U sharp with a minimum level. 
 However, only corporations in Anglo-Saxon system have dispersed ownership such as in 
the US and UK. In most corporation across the world, the firm control lies with one or several 
shareholders, instead of managers. These shareholders could be families, state, institutional 
investors, and industrial companies. Therefore, the separation of ownership and control 
concerns only shareholders. There are two types of shareholders, the controlling shareholders 
and the minority shareholders. The controlling shareholders have enough control over firm 
operations by influencing firm decision-making process, while the minority shareholders are 
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short of power to interfere. Therefore, in these countries, the dominant agency problems is the 
expropriation of minority shareholders.  
 There are mainly two forms of expropriations, related party transactions and the fights for 
controlling position. The related party transactions happened when the controlling shareholders 
in a firm are the owners or shareholders of other firms in which he/she have more shares. The 
controlling shareholders could increase her own interests by transferring assets or profits from 
a firm to the firm where she has a higher stake. It is normally referred to as tunneling (Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2000). The controlling shareholders also could 
overcharging a firm by selling the products or serves from the firm where she has a higher 
stake1. Family control shareholders may prefer to choose a family member to manage the firm, 
rather hiring the candidate on the labour market, referring as nepotism. Occasionally, the fights 
between controlling shareholder even due to uneconomic reasons (for example, different 
political view) decrease firm value, referring to infighting.  
 Discussions on Ownership and Control 
To deeply understand the complexity of modern corporate governance, the ownership and 
control has to be more clearly defined. Ownership is the ownership of cash flow rights. Cash 
flow rights provide shareholders rights to claim their share in firm’s earning when a firm is 
continually going. They also give rights to claim the residuals interests when a firm is 
liquidated.  Control is the ownership of control rights, depending on how many voting rights 
the shareholders have. 
 Only in the UK and US, the ownership and control are separated, and main types of 
shareholders are institutional investors and board members. However, in Eastern Europe, Asia 
and Continental Western Europe, corporate control is concentrated and lies with one or few 
                                                
1 Some researcher give it a name as transfer pricing, others see it as a type of tunneling.  
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shareholders that are families, holding companies and government. The table below shows the 
combinations of ownerships and controls. 
 
Table 1. Combinations of Ownership and Control 
    Ownership 
    dispersed  Concentrated  
Control 
Weak A. UK, US B. Rare 
Strong 
C.  common in 
developed 
economies  
D. common in the rest 
of world (emerging 
markets) 
   
 
1.2 Corporate Governance Issues that are Unique to China 
 There are two chapters in my thesis studying corporate governance issue in China. Most 
developed theories and empirical studies are based on developed markets, mainly the US and 
UK. To do research in emerging markets, researchers have to clarify the uniqueness of each 
market, and identify which types of agency problems addressed. In this section, I discuss some 
important governance issues in China.  
1.2.1 Ownership Structure 
 The ownership structure is complex due to historical reasons, and becomes more 
modernized or westernised recently. I summaries the timeline for regulation changes and their 
impact on shareholdings in Chinese firms (Table 2).  After the Split Share Reform in China, 
the invertor composition has massively changed. In 2012, individuals hold 25.33% of all 
tradeable shares; mutual funds, insurance firms and QFIIs accounts for 7.59%, 3.74 and 1.40 
respectively; other 27.28% are held by ordinary institutional investors (Jiang and Kim, 2015). 
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Table 2. Big Events and Their Impact on the Ownership of Listed Firm in China 
Timeline Event Largest shareholders Other type of investors 
Dec 1990 
(July1991)  
The Shanghai (first) and 
Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges were launched. 
Central, local governments, 
and legal persons (most are 
state owned or partially state-
owned, some are private 
owned) 
individuals 
    Non-tradable shares Tradable shares 
1998     closed-end funds/mutual fund 
1999(2004)     insurance/funds 
2003     QFII 
2003(2005)     the National Social Fund indirectly (directly) 
2005 
China Split Share reform. 
All nontradable shares 
start to be transformed 
into tradable shares. 
Tradable shares / restricted 
shares  Tradable shares 
  
 However, situation of ownership concentration has not changed. Most firms have state 
ownership and controlling shareholders. In the Angulo-Saxon markets with dispersed 
ownership, larger shareholder have means and incentives to monitoring managers, which could 
mintage the agency problem between manager and shareholders (e.g Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). As we discuss above, however in most countries, a large shareholder could actually 
control the firms and managers. The controlling shareholders may expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders, which is the main agency problem in most countries (e.g. La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).  
 In China, listed firms can be divided into two groups based on the ultimate controlling 
shareholder: State-owned-enterprises (SOEs) or non SOEs. The SOEs has ultimately controlled 
by government or State-owned-enterprises, accounting for about 65% in all firms. In both 
SOEs and non SOEs normally have a largest shareholder that own about 30-40% of the listed 
firm based on the calculations using the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
Database.  
 9 
 The question of whether larger shareholders may monitor the firm or expropriate the 
interests from minority shareholder is still an open question. The empirical research examines 
the relationship between larger shareholder ownership and firm performance. Their results are 
mixed when different accounting or market measures are used or different cutting off 
proportions are to category largest shareholding (e.g. Bai and Xu, 2005; Chen, Firth, and Xu, 
2009). Therefore, these results need to be interpret with cations. 
 More interestingly, there are many SOEs in China with state agents or SOEs as their largest 
shareholder. Some empirical results show that the state ownership is negative with firm value 
(Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2005). However, most researcher do not claim state engages in tunneling. 
They argue that state may use SOEs to pursue other objectives (political or society) rather 
merely profit maximizing, but less likely for private benefit. Some paper find CEOs or other 
managers in SOEs are involving in tunneling but illicit wealth gain of managers. Therefore, 
agency problems in SOEs are more likely to be the problem between manager and shareholders.  
 After 2005, various institutional investors participate the China’ capital market. Two 
necessary conditions are required to institutional investor to play monitoring role: a) they have 
larger shareholding b) they have long-run horizon (X. Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). In China, 
the turnover rate of institution investor is quit high, and shareholding only account for about 
4% (Jiang and Kim, 2015). Some studies shows shareholder activism of institutional investor 
in China, but they may fail to reveal the causality relationship. The channels of how 
institutional investors engage in corporate governance issues and whether institutional investor 
achieve their objectives are vague. 
1.2.2 Capital Structure and Dividends Policy 
 The debt holder monitoring and shareholders pressure on dividends are disciplinary 
mechanisms in developed market, because they can mitigate the agency costs of free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986). However, these two functions are weak in China. 
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 Creditor rights are still weak in China. Bankruptcy law in China provides creditors a channel 
to go force their borrower to endure bankruptcy proceedings and recover any defaulted 
principal and interests. However, bankruptcies are extremely rare. Some firms are aided by 
local governments to prevent unemployment and stable society (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005) . 
Second, the majority lenders are not play monitoring role. Chinese banking industry is still 
concentrated, and four big state controlling banks and around 20 national-level domestic joint-
equity banks. These banks have strong incentive to provide loan to larger firms and state-owned 
firms because larger firms and state-owned firms have the government underwriting or 
guarantee to pay off (Allen et al., 2005; Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2009) 
 In China, the dividend payoff ratios are low compared. This is because minority shareholder 
rights are weak in China, so they are incompetent to pressure firms to offer pay-outs. Another 
explanation is that the Chinese investors are more speculator, who goes after capital gains and 
concern less about dividends (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). Therefore, dividend pay-out 
policy is hardly an effective device to moderate any type of agency costs in China. 
 
1.3 The role of non-executive directors in corporate governance and my research: in a 
developed market (UK) and an emerging market (China) 
 
My thesis has examined the role of non-executive directors in a developed market (UK) and 
in an emerging market (China). The board of directors is a universal corporate governance 
mechanism across the world. They are also in the center of public and media criticism 
whenever corporate scandals happen. One main task of the board is monitoring corporate or 
top management misconducts, so corporate scandals make people question about directors’ 
work diligence. How to make the board of director more effective is a key topic in corporate 
governance. Basically, there are four dominant research theme in of board literature illustrated 
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in Figure 1 in U.S., U.K. and Western European literature: what directors do, board structure, 
how directors work, what motives directors (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2010).  
 
1.3.1 Agency theory 
In the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, board of directors (particularly, non-
executive directors) play a central role in monitoring managers on behave of shareholders. 
Their main tasks are monitoring of what top management does and evaluating managerial 
ability, then firing underperformed management and selecting the fitting replacement (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). However, the function of board of directors is still under discussion. It 
has been censured for lack of independence, deficient attention and incentives (Tirole, 2010). 
Directors rarely have disapproval of top management’ decisions in board meetings. Recently 
more empirical evidence shows that board of directors become more active. More studies are 
still needed to investigate the dynamics in the boardroom to improve the effectiveness of boards.  
Most importantly, board of directors is a governance mechanism of which effectiveness 
depends on the effectiveness of others2 (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang, 2008). For example, if board of director fails to 
discipline the underperformed top management, a takeover bid is crucial to remove an 
entrenched management team. It is also suggested that the efficiency of a package of 
governance mechanisms differs systematically with the institutional structure at the “country” 
level (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2002). National culture affects the institutional context, 
ultimately influences the governance mechanisms at the firm level.  
 
                                                
2 Internal mechanisms includes board of directors, ownership structure, executive compensation plans; external 
mechanisms contains take over market, product market competition, and managerial labour market.    
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1.3.2 Non-executive director reputation concerns: evidence from UK (Chapter 1) 
In the first chapter of my thesis, I investigate what factor motives non-executives in 
competitive labour market (UK market), particularly focus on audit committee members. 
Literature in corporate governance point out that audit committee (AC) plays a critical role in 
the improving the quality of financial reporting and ensuring the independence of statutory 
auditing (Cadbury Committee, 1992; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). However, how to improve 
auditor committee’s effectiveness is a key issue. Most studies examine how variations of 
committee structure affect audit committee outcomes (audit choice, audit fee, earning 
management). They assume that independence of audit committee, composition and the 
experience/expertise of individual directors could influence audit committee members’ 
behaviour.  
Recently, a few papers start to examine the how to enhance the effectiveness of audit 
committee in terms of increasing AC member motivations.  Director compensation plans in 
practice are more likely to be an unresolved agency problem, rather than a tool to reduce the 
agency costs between top management and shareholders. Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) find 
a strong positive association between excess CEO comopensation and excess director 
compensation. Moreover, Archambeault, DeZoort and Hermanson (2008) states that only small 
share of firms have option compensation for Audit committee,  and AC option compensation 
is positive related to audit failure (financial report restatements). As a result, the 
implementation of AC compensation plans demands great precautions.  
From agency theory perspective (Fama, 1980), reputation concerns are possibly a stronger 
motive for non-executive directors, because reputation assists in obtain more board seats or 
retaining the ones already held, a weak reputation the opposite. For audit committee members, 
the punishment for frauds of serving firms is even more severe, because it is their responsibility 
to prevent these frauds or scandals.  Fich and Shivdasani (2007) document that in financial 
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fraud firms (have been involved in lawsuits), directors do see a significant drop in other board 
seats, this drop is greater for AC members. Moreover, audit committee members have 
accounting or finance backgrounds, and have lower social status than other types of directors 
(e.g., Erkens and Bonner, 2012). It indicates that audit committee members have to work harder 
to remain in the director market. Therefore, inspecting the function of reputation on audit 
committee members give us a clear setting about how reputation works, because audit 
committee members care about their reputation more than others and their responsibilities are 
clearer designed by corporate governance code (or law).  
The auditor change, as AC’s main task, has been chosen in our study. Auditor is most 
important goalkeeper in corporate governance. It can directly find top management’s illegal 
activity director, provide directors information to assess CEO ability, and reduce the 
information asymmetry between top management and shareholders (all stakeholders). An 
external auditor change signals the desire and authority of audit committee members to increase 
the independence of external auditing and thus improve the audit quality. The first chapter of 
my thesis examines whether audit committees with a higher proportion of reputable members 
more likely to change auditor.  
Using a sample of UK listed firms over the period from 2001 to 2009, I found that the 
likelihood of auditor change increases with the proportion of audit committee reputable 
members. Audit committee members with a higher reputation demand for higher audit auditors. 
The proportion of reputable members is positively related to the commonly used measures for 
audit quality, except for the industry-specialisation. The results suggest that reputation plays 
an important role in making audit committee members work diligently to improve the quality 
of financial reporting by changing auditors. Higher reputable audit committee members have 
more reputation incentives and influence to push through the idea of changing an auditor and 
choosing an auditor who provides a higher audit quality. 
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1.3.3 Alternative theories of board of directors in emerging markets (China) 
The emerging markets call for a different package of corporate governance mechanism, 
since the institutional context vary from the developed countries and the agency conflicts 
happen between controlling shareholders and minority shareholder. Contrast to the U.S based 
evidence, emerging markets lack of external governance mechanisms. In these countries, 
internal governance mechanisms become more consequential (e.g., Ferreira and Matos, 2008; 
Klapper and Love, 2004). Specially, the cotrolling shareholder in the emerging market as 
discussed above is a source of princial-princial conflicts, rather than a governance mechanism. 
All these arguments rise an equation that how to improve the quality of corporate governance 
in emerging countries. Most police makers believe that one of low cost ways is to enhance the 
effectiveness of boards of directors. Corporate guidances of more and more emerging countries 
call for particular board structure and activities in listed firms. Therefore, whether board of 
directors work effectively in a emerging market is an empirical question.  
I focus on Chinese market not only becasue it is the second largest ecnomy across the world 
but also the regulators of the Chinese market repetily emphasise the role of independent 
directors in Chinese listed firms. Additionally, independent directors are supposed to act in a 
similar way to those in the U.S. according to China's laws. 
 
1.3.3.1 Resource dependence theory.  It considers board of directors as boundary spanners who 
obtain resources from the environment (Pfeffer, 1972).  It suggests that the resource-rich non-
executive directors can bring more resources to the firm, so are beneficial to firm value. 
Empirical evidences mostly using U.S. data demonstrate that interlocking directorates may aid 
in corporations’ borrowing, information attainment, and strategic alliance formation (e.g., 
Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Gulati and Westphal, 1999). 
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China’s institutional environment and organizations provide an opportunity to extend this 
research (Peng 2004). The Chinese culture have a higher propensity to rely on network ties,  
“Guanxi”, to achieve business goals, on the condition of imperfect market (low trust and lack 
of efficiency). Li, Poppo, and Zhou (2008) find that foreign corporations could utilize 
managerial network ties to operate business in China, to add only conditional value. Sheng, 
Zhou, and Li (2011) show that directors’ business ties and political ties have various effect on 
firm preformation based on different market eviroment. However, these studies and others 
employ small-sample interview and survey data. More research is necessary to explore whether 
director’s ties atribute to firm value with larger-sample archival data.  
 
1.3.3.2 Institutional theory. It proposes that directors may be appointed for different reasons: 
regulative, normative 3 , and cognitive reason (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In China, the 
mandatory requirements on board structure launched in 2001, as a part of marketization of 
listed firms (CSRC, 2001). List firms have to appoint independent directors who account for 
at least one third of total number of directors. the board of directors. However, the 
responsibilities and accountabilities of independent directors are not well designed in related 
regulation rules or law. Hence the regulative pressure is questionable in the Chinese context. 
The normative pressure of the institutional environment could enhance the probability of 
appointing high-quality independent directors. Yet the scholars’ opinion and media coverage 
of improving the role of directors in listed firms may not strong enough in China (Peng, 2004). 
Cognitive pressures may be vague as well.  Even in the U.S., top management often select 
independent directors who are less like to challenge them (e.g., Westphal and Zajac, 1996). 
                                                
3  Organizations seek to behave in ways that will not cause them to be noticed as different and consequently 
singled out for criticism 
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Overall, listed firms could only appoint independent directors in order to comply with the 
institutional demands, but the independent directors’ representation may not increase firm 
value. 
 
1.3.4 Empirical research on independent directors in China: firm value, earnings management, 
related party transactions, CEO turnover and compensation. 
Whether boards of directors contribute corporate governance in China’s context is still 
under debates. The U.S style system of boards of directors formally launched in China in 2001. 
Since then, numbers of studies have examined the effects of independent directors on firm 
value, CEO dismissal and compensation, earnings management, and related party transactions. 
These outcomes are associated with type I and type II agency problem.  
Empirical studies documents mixed results on the relationship between board independence 
and firm performance. Studies employed data from 19994 over three or five years often show 
insignificant association (e.g., Peng, 2004). In contrast, recent studies which use longer panel 
data from 2005, often documents board independence improves firm operating performance 
with various robustness checks and identification strategies (Liu et al., 2015). Liu et al. (2015) 
find that board independence reduces tunneling through intercorporate loans and improves 
investment efficiency, especially in government-controlled firms. Lo et al, (2010) shows that 
firms with a board that has a higher percentage of independent directors or a lower percentage 
of “parent” directors (i.e., directors who are representatives of the parent companies of the 
listed firms) are less likely to engage in transfer pricing manipulations. 
                                                
4 In 1999, CSRC started to draft the ‘Guidance of independent directors of China’, the code was implemented 
from 2001.  
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 Executive turnover and compensation, and their sensitivities to firm performance have been 
the focus of numerous studies. They specify crucial measures of governance effectiveness with 
which a firm solves two principal–agent problems. First, the interest conflicts between top 
management and shareholders result in managerial entrenchment. Second, interest conflicts 
between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders may lead to the 
expropriation of the latter by the former. The second agency problem is analyzed and referred 
to as tunneling by Bebchuk (1999), Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000), and Peng, 
Wei, and Yang (2011). By linking the personal fortune of top executives to the performance of 
the firm, the interests of the shareholders and those of management are aligned. In addition, 
the insider alliance between the controlling shareholder and management is also severed so that 
the interests of outside investors or minority shareholders are protected to some extent. Hence, 
the relationship between executive turnover and performance can be indicative of the quality 
of the corporate governance system in a firm. 
 The relationship between CEO turnover (compensation) and performance have been One 
increase concern in China’s context is entrenched managers: whether internal corporate 
governance mechanisms work to dismiss underperformed CEOs who are often affiliated with 
the controlling shareholders). Since the early 2000s China's public firms have been under 
pressure from investors to reform (Allen et al., 2005), the institutional context may change. 
New empirical studies are needs to investigate the whether independent directors could play 
the effective discipline role. In summary, previous empirical studies often use board 
composition (the ratio of independent director, political connected director etc.) to measure 
internal governance quality with short panel data.  
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 The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) emphasises the monitoring role of 
independent director system from 2001. CSRC also introduced a practice5 that differs from 
those adopted in developed markets. That is, independent directors are obliged to issue 
Report[s] of the Independent Director after meetings, in order to publicly release topics 
discussed and their opinions on important board decisions. These reports provide us new 
possibility to test whether boards of directors work effectively or not in Chinese context. From 
these reports, I calculate meeting frequency of various meeting topics and estimate the tone of 
these reports, and examine how the outcomes of firm optimal decisions influence corporate 
governance and firm value in Chapter 2 and 3.  
 
1.3.5 Quality of corporate governance and various type of board meetings: evidence from 
China (Chapter 2). 
 I examine the relationship between numbers of topic-specific board meetings and efficiency 
of corporate governance. Quality of corporate governance is proxy by CEO turnover-
performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. The measures of numbers of topics-
specific meeting are calculated based on the reports of independent directors of Chinese listed 
firms over the period of 2005 to 2015. We document that directors meet more often to discuss 
growth strategies for the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions can increase the 
CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. Moreover, more discussing the nomination of 
directors and top management decrease the sensitivities of CEO turnover and compensation to 
performance. It sheds light on what makes boards more effective, and how board monitoring 
of different decisions at board meetings modifies the connection between CEO interests and 
firm performance. 
                                                
5 The new corporate governance guidelines for Chinese listed firms (2001, 2002). 
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1.3.6 Hidden information from reports of independent directors: evidence from China (Chapter 
3) 
 I examine whether the information content of independent director reports (IDRs) has 
predication power on corporate performance. We generate the tone of IDRs by using Chinese 
word segmentation and Naïve Bayesian machine leaning algorithm. We find that the average 
tone of the IDRs is positively related with future firm performance after controlling other 
factors that influence firm performance. Our results also show that directors with more careers 
concerns are more likely to be critical and using negative tone when they express opinions. 
Furthermore, the negative tone of IDRs is negatively associated with firm performance for 
firms with greater monitoring necessities. This study provides new evidence on corporate 
disclosures by using a large sample dataset of director’s views on firm profitability. It explores 
directors’ roles in corporate governance via director disclosures rather drawing interferences 
from board structure such as board composition.  
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Chapter 2: Audit Committee’s Reputation and Auditor Change: 
Evidence from UK Listed Companies 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine whether director reputation affects audit committee effectiveness in maintaining 
and improving external audit quality. We argue that the director’s reputation can be a source 
of incentives to motivate audit committee members to work diligently and demand a high 
quality audit. Reputation is also related to substantive power and influence, which can enhance 
the authority of the audit committee members when fulfilling their responsibilities. We find 
that an audit committee consisting of many reputable members is more likely to change the 
auditor. They’re also more likely to employ an auditor with a highly recognised brand-name or 
an auditor with a larger size. This study enhances our understanding of the role of reputation 
incentives in audit committee effectiveness.  
 
 
Key Words: Auditor change, Audit committee, Reputation, Corporate governance 
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3.1 Introduction 
An audit committee plays an important monitoring role in improving the quality of financial 
reporting and ensuring the independence of statutory auditing (Cadbury Committee, 1992; 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Smith Committee, 2003; Klein, 2002). The call for a more effective 
audit committee as an important source of improvement in corporate governance becomes 
more urgent with each wave of financial irregularities especially after a number of high-profile 
accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, World.com). A large body of literature on audit committee 
effectiveness have focused almost exclusively on audit committee independence, composition 
and the experience/expertise of individual directors. To date, few studies have investigated the 
non-pecuniary incentives of audit committee members. This work aims to investigate whether 
the reputation of audit committee members affect audit committee effectiveness. 
 Dezoort et al. (2002, P.41) define an effective audit committee as a committee that “has 
qualified members with the authority and resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring 
reliable financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management through its diligent 
oversight efforts”. Authority (e.g., responsibilities, influence), composition (e.g., independence, 
expertise), resources (e.g., access to management) and diligence (e.g., incentives, motivation) 
are the main components affect the performance and effectiveness of an audit committee in 
fulfilling their responsibilities. Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) consider the willingness of an audit 
committee to carry out their duties as their most important attribute. Audit committee’s 
influence, combined with their responsibilities derived from the law and regulations (e.g., SOX, 
Cadbury Report and Combined Codes), gives audit committee members the authority to act in 
the best interest of shareholders. We analyse the role of director reputation in motivating 
directors’ due diligence and exerting influence from the agency and the organisational 
sociology perspectives.  
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 From the perspective of agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980), directors have 
strong incentives to preserve and enhance their reputation, which directly influences the value 
of their human capital and the probability of them losing or getting directorships in the future. 
In an efficient managerial labour market, directors who have a reputation as a good monitor 
will be rewarded with board appointments at other firms and associated benefits such as 
compensation, prestige, power and access to valuable networks (Levit and Malenko, 2016). 
Lax directors who act against shareholder interests will be penalised by losing their positions 
and benefits. Penalties for poor monitoring are more severe to audit committee members who 
are held accountable (e.g., Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber, 2012; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). 
Srinivasan (2005) documents substantial turnover for audit committee members, but only a 
small decline in other board seats held by outside directors in firms restating earnings. The 
Tesco accounting scandal in 2014/15 led to turnovers for all audit committee members before 
2016, while other non-executive directors kept their posts.  
 Beyond offering incentives for due diligence, reputation is directly related to substantive 
power and influence which can enhance the authority of audit committee members. The 
reputation and status of participants shapes the conversations and communication in groups. 
Therefore, firm decisions are viewed as an outcome of interactions between the management 
and the board of directors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Audit committee members need both 
the ability and authority to gain respect from managers to influence the auditing and financial 
reporting process. Reputation can directly influences how managers view the audit committee 
members’ ability and competency, which provides disincentives for managers’ self-interested 
behavior, such as manipulating accounting numbers (D’Aveni, 1990; Pollock et al., 2010; 
Badolato et al., 2014).  
 Drawing from directors’ reputation incentives and influence, this study aims to shed some 
light on the question of whether audit committees with a 
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members are likely to be more effective in fulfilling their responsibilities. According to the 
Combined Code (2008), one of audit committee responsibilities is to make recommendations 
to the board on appointment, re-appointment and removal of the external auditor, review and 
monitor the independence of the external auditing process. The management in a normal 
operation is less willing to change the external auditor due to risk and cost concerns. The 
process of auditor selection and re-educating a new auditor makes auditor switching costly 
(Blouin, Grein, and Rountree, 2007). It could also send a negative signal to the capital market 
(Knechel, Naiker, and Pacheco, 2007). To reduce agency costs and information asymmetry 
between the management and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the audit committee 
should ensure a dependent external auditing of high quality. The audit committee will change 
the external auditor only when agency benefits is in excess of switching costs (DeFond, 1992). 
An external auditor change signals the desire and authority of audit committee members to 
increase the independence of external auditing and thus improve the audit quality. DeAngelo 
(1981a, 1981b) suggests that the quality of services supplied varies among auditors. Changing 
the external auditor results in a change in the audit quality.  
 Measuring external audit quality is a difficult exercise, as the degree of assurance that 
auditors provide is unobservable. Under the framework of DeFond and Zhang (2014), auditor’s 
incentives for independence associated with reputation and litigation costs, as well as auditor’s 
competency reflected in factors such as expertise, can affect the supply of audit quality. 
Following the literature, we use three proxies for audit quality: auditor name-brand reputation, 
size (Johnson and Lys, 1990) and industry specialisation (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995). 
Reputable audit committee members are expected to select an external auditor with a better 
name-brand reputation/larger size, or the one who is more specialised in the client’s industry. 
 This study offers two main contributions to the literature. First, in answering the question 
of whether a director’s reputation affects audit committee effectiveness in maintaining and 
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improving external audit quality, it provides a theoretical contribution by analysing audit 
committee members’ reputation with their due diligence and influence from both agency and 
organisational sociology perspectives. While previous research focuses on independence, 
activity and accounting/finance expertise on audit selection (Abbott and Parker, 2000), 
restatement (Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004), and earnings management (Klein, 2002), this 
research reveals a new channel through which reputation motivates and enables audit 
committee members to effectively fulfil their responsibilities.  
 Second, this study extends the literature related to director’s non-pecuniary incentives. 
Recent empirical research (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Yermack, 2004) finds that the 
financial incentives of non-executive directors are not strong enough to motivate effective 
monitoring. Only one study, to date, explores the effect of reputation incentives for all 
independent directors on firm performance (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). They treated non-
executive directors’ responsibility equally, investigating how boards affect firm performance. 
However, whether the increase in firm value comes from board monitoring or the advisory 
channel is not clear. In fact, the ability and experience of individual directors on a board are 
diversified and they are appointed to a board to play different roles. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that there will be a ‘substantial devaluation of human capital’ when directors neglect 
their monitoring duties. Audit committee members, who are responsible for monitoring, are 
less likely to find a directorship in another listed firm due to a lower social status for 
accounting/finance experience (Erkens and Bonner, 2013), but they more likely to be penalised 
due to financial irregularities. We provide new evidence on the effect of a director’s reputation 
in an environment with high reputation cost.  
 In the following section, a framework to explain the effects of director reputation on audit 
committee effectiveness will be presented and the main hypothesis will be developed. The 
sample, measures and a research model will be clarified and introduced in Section 3. This is 
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followed by the analysis of the main results on auditor (quality) change in Section 4. In Section 
5, we develop and show our examinations of earnings quality corresponding to voluntary and 
involuntary auditor changes. A final discussion of the results is given to conclude this study in 
Section 6.  
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 The Role of the Audit Committee in UK Corporate Governance 
To improve the quality of financial reporting and ensure an independent statutory audit, 
the Cadbury Committee (1992) argued that the board should establish an appropriately 
structured audit committee of at least three non-executive directors with terms which 
clearly clarify its authority and duties. Building on this, the subsequent UK experience 
of audit committees was consolidated and given additional authority through a series of 
publications (i.e., Combined Code 1999, 2003; 2006; 2008; Financial Reporting 
Council 2010) regarding audit committee composition, independence and expertise. 
So far, the literature on the effectiveness of audit committee in the UK is very limited. Weir, 
Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2002) find that the existence of audit committee has no impact on 
firm performance. Goddard and Masters (2000) fail to find the existence of audit committee 
affects the size of auditing fees. Another strand of literature on UK auditing committees 
explores whether the composition and characteristics of the audit committee matters for its 
effectiveness. O’Sullivan (2000) documents that the independence of external auditors, 
measured by audit fees, is likely to be improved by a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors. Mangena and Pike (2005) find a positive association between UK audit committee 
financial expertise and interim disclosure. Mangena and Tauringana (2008) show that audit 
committee size and number of meetings do not affect the decision to engage auditors in interim 
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financial reporting. Given that research beyond composition and activity of audit committees 
in the UK is scarce, we aim to contribute to the literature to explore the role of reputation of 
audit committee members. 
 
3.2.2 Audit committee Reputation: Incentive and Authority 
Under the theoretical framework of Dezoort et al. (2002) and Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013), 
an audit committee serves the ultimate goal of the protection of stakeholder interests by using 
qualified audit committee members with authority and resources to provide diligent oversight. 
Director reputation provides a primary incentive to motivate audit committee member’s due 
diligence, and reputation is directly related to their influence in fulfilling the responsibilities. 
Fama (1980) and Fama and Jesen (1983) argue that outside directors have incentives to develop 
a reputation as an effective monitor to signal to shareholders as well as the labour market. In 
an efficient labour market, reputation is a valuable asset. Any significant increase in reputation 
opens up opportunities to additional directorships (Fama, 1980), while a single failure causes 
a large decline in its value (Diamond, 1989). Hence, directors are more self-disciplined to 
maintain and develop their reputation to gain more board seats and thereby obtain prestige, 
power, compensation and access to valuable networks (Levit and Malenko, 2016). Reputation 
incentives are found to motivate independent directors to improve monitoring with an increased 
board attendance rate (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014) and engage in active monitoring with more 
management proposal dissensions at board meetings (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao, 2016).  
 In line with the view that an effective monitoring reputation is rewarded, a few studies have 
found directors are held accountable for failing to monitor the management. Coles and Hoi 
(2003) show that non-executive directors who rejected all or some of the Pennsylvania Senate 
Bill 1310 (SB1310) antitakeover provisions were three times as likely to gain external 
directorships as those who retained the provisions over the three years after SB1310. Srinivasan 
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(2005) documents substantial turnover for audit committee members, but only a small decline 
in other board seats held by outside directors in firms restating earnings.  Fich and Shivdasani 
(2007) find that, following a financial fraud lawsuit, directors are likely to lose board seats at 
other firms, particularly those with strong governance.  
An audit committee with strong composition, resources and willingness to act on behalf of 
shareholders also needs the authority to achieve effectiveness. Authority is a function of an 
audit committee’s responsibilities (derived from law, regulations, guidance) and influence. The 
influence also depends on the audit committee’s relationship with management, 
internal/external auditors and the board, as a whole. More reputable directors are able to stay 
focused on their own goals and have more of an ability to obtain firm information. Their ability 
and willingness to monitor have been recognised in the labour market (Levit and Malenko, 
2016). Audit committees with higher reputation are considered to be more experienced and 
authoritative from the past provisions or the peer reviews, because reputation improves 
command respect (D’Aveni, 1990). Badolato, Ege, and Donelson (2013) reveal that audit 
committees reduce the accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals when at least one 
higher-status financial expert sits on the committee. Beck and Mauldin (2014) find that the 
negotiation of an audit fee reduction relies on the relative power of the audit committee and 
the CFO. 
 
3.2.3 The Effect of Audit Committee Reputation on Auditor Change and Auditor Quality 
The management in a normal operation is less likely to change the external auditor, as an 
auditor change can be very costly. The Survey of the US General Accounting Office (2003) 
shows that 92 per cent of the respondents from Fortune 1000 firms considered switching to a 
new auditor as problematic. This is because the client (management) needs to educate the new 
auditor about the firm’s operations, systems, financial reporting practices, and accounting 
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issues. The education process is a time-consuming and expensive activity. The selection 
process of a new auditor is also costly. The change of an auditor may increase the risk of audit 
failure (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). It also has a significant negative impact on the short-
term stock returns (Krishnamurthy, Zhou, and Zhou, 2006). Reports of resigned/dismissed 
auditors often disclose the weakness in a firm’s corporate governance, which leads to a 
negative market reaction (Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare, 2008; Teoh, 1992). Auditing 
serves as an important monitoring mechanism to provide assurance on the credibility of 
financial statements to mitigate agency problems in public firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
 It’s unclear, however, whether director reputation provides audit committee members with 
sufficient incentives and influence to fulfil their responsibilities on behalf of shareholders. The 
underlying reason for this is that the composition of a board is endogenously chosen when top 
management has a significant amount of control over it (Hermalin and Weiback 1998). It’s 
reasonable to assume that the top management is more likely to appoint directors who would 
comply with the management’s desires (Lorsch, J. W., 1989; Zajac and Westphal, 1996). In 
addition, audit committee members often climb up the elite ladder by working in the accounting 
or finance industry. They have a relatively lower status than other types of directors in the 
serving firm (D’Aveni, 1990). As a result, these restrain audit committee members to be 
effective monitors. 
Reputation motivates audit committee members’ due diligence and enables them to exert 
more influence on the overseeing process. The audit committee members, with accounting and 
finance background, tend to have a lower status (the prestige accorded actors because of their 
social position) than the other directors (Erkens and Bonner, 2013). This results in a lower 
probability of members in audit committees being appointed in larger firms. Reputation is 
defined by the prestige accorded because of their prior performance and occupation (Wilson, 
1985). The occupational factor is associated with being linked to social resources attainments 
 32 
(Hollingshead, 1975; Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel, 1981). Directors who work in the larger firms 
are more likely to have a higher status, which could help them play more of an important role 
in the group decision-making process.  
If an audit committee member is working in a larger firm, it indicates that their capability 
as a diligent monitor has been recognised by the director’s labour market. Firm uses directors 
to build its reputation, while a director also uses the directorship to enhance his/her personal 
reputation. Directorship is not just a job description, but more importantly a process in 
advancing in reputation and contacts (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988). They have more reputation 
incentives to be independent of the management and have more influence in the negotiations 
with managers, when there are conflicts between them and the managers. 
 The empirical research argues that firm size is a natural source of director reputation 
incentives. Larger firms provide a director with greater visibility, status (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009), reimbursement (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), and the possibility of gaining extra 
directorships (Yermack, 2004). Our reputation measure is similar to Masulis and Mobbs (2014), 
as it is based on the size of a firm relative to other firm that an independent director also serves. 
Thus, we hypothesise the following: 
H1: Audit committees with a higher proportion of reputable members demand for a higher audit 
quality. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
This study investigates the effects of audit committee reputation on a sample of non-
financial firms listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period of 2001 to 2009. We 
examine this sample period to rule out the effects of the merger between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers & Lybrand in 1998 and the financial crisis after 2008. Our data originates from two 
sources. The financial data was retrieved from Worldscope via DataStream, which offers 
 33 
fundamental data on public and private firms. Our initial sample includes approximately 4,900 
firm-year observations. The corporate governance data of the listed firms and firms’ auditors 
were manually collected from the Corporate Register. The Corporate Register covers self-
reported information for all the UK companies regarding market capitalisation, equity share 
capital, directors, bankers, financial advisers, and auditors. Both databases claim that they 
contain the population of all public firms. Yet, approximately 10 per cent of observations are 
not overlapping. To diminish the potential outlier issue, we winsorise the outliers of the 
financial data by the top and bottom 1 per cent of the distribution annually. Firms that have 
less than three years of observations and have more than one auditor are excluded from the 
sample. The final dataset contains 668 firms (4,415 firm-year observations) with auditor, 
financial and governance information.6 
The auditor change selection process follows a two-step procedure. First, a sample that 
involved all of the auditor changes was selected from 2001 to 2009. In total, 219 changes were 
identified by auditor name-brand switches (e.g., from “Deloitte and Touche” to “Ernst and 
Young”). Secondly, a sub-sample of involuntarily auditor changes (Arthur Andersen’s 66 
clients), due to AA surrendered its CPA licences in 2002, were excluded. As a result, a sample 
of 156 voluntary changes (889 observations) was utilised in our main analysis. 
 
3.3.2 Dependent Variables 
 Auditor Change. This is the dependent variable. It is equal to one when the current auditor 
differs from the previous auditor, and zero otherwise. It contains only voluntarily changes. 
Panel A in Table 1 shows that the auditor change rate in the UK was very low, on average, the 
                                                
6 Muravyev, Talavera and Weir (2016) also used Corporate Register, They mentioned the issue of reducing 
observations when merging datasets. Our sample size for non-financial firms in the UK is similar to theirs.  
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change rate was 4.03% over the period of 2001 to 2009. This is consistent with the figures in 
the Oxera Report (2006). 
 
Table 1. 
 Auditor changes and audit quality changes from 2002 to 2009 
 
Panel A: Auditor changes by year 
Year Number of Firms Frequency of Auditor 
Change 
Percentage of Auditor 
Change 
2002 569 25 4.39% 
2003 581 23 3.96% 
2004 542 15 2.77% 
2005 491 26 5.30% 
2006 446 10 2.24% 
2007 446 32 7.17% 
2008 420 14 3.33% 
2009 376 11 2.93% 
Total 3871 156 4.03% 
 
Panel B: Changes related to name-brand reputation 
 
From Big Four 
to local (-2) 
From Big Four 
to national or 
from national to 
local (-1) 
No change in 
reputation (0) 
From national 
to Big Four or 
from local to 
national (1) 
From local to 
Big Four (1) 
Number of 
Changes 13 22 82 28 11 
 
Panel C: Changes in auditor size 
  Mean Median 
Changes in auditor size (a) 1.074 1.039 
 
Panel D: Changes related to industry specialisation 
 From industry specialist 
to non-specialist  (-1) 
No change in industry 
specialist (0) 
Non-industry specialist 
to industry specialist (1) 
Number of 
Changes 36 87 33 
(a) Notes: Changes in auditor size is measured as the ratio of new auditor size over the incumbent 
auditor size. 
 
 Changes in the external auditor quality are also used as dependant variables. Three measures 
for audit quality have been utilised in this study to capture the changes in the likelihood that 
the auditor will discover and disclose substantial violations in the accounting system.  
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 Proxies for Auditor Quality. Auditor quality has been measured in several ways in the 
literature. One key measure is (1) Name-Brand Reputation that uses memberships in the Big 
X7, national reputation and regional/local reputation to group auditor reputation. It is usually 
the case that an auditor’s revenue is positively related to its reputation. The revenue (client-
specific quasi-rents-fee premium 8) will be reduced if there is an audit failure (Ding and Jia, 
2012; DeAngelo, 1981b). Wealthier auditors are exposed to higher litigation risks and suffer 
more from accounting scandals, and therefore they have a greater incentive to supply a high-
quality service to protect their reputation and wealth (Dye, 1993).  
 In this study, a value of two is assigned to the Big Four auditors that have an international 
reputation; values of one and zero are given to second-tier firms that have a national reputation 
and other auditors that have only a regional/local reputation, respectively. The classification 
criterion is based on the fee income of the major auditor firms, published by the Financial 
Reporting Council (2005). Audit fee incomes for audit firms with international reputation are 
between £496.0M and £290.7M; incomes for auditors with national reputation ranges from 
£55.8M to £27.0M; income for other auditors are below £19.7M. The change related to the 
name-brand reputation is measured as the value of the new auditor minus the value of the 
incumbent auditor, yielding a variable of five values (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2). This is a ranked-order 
variable: positive numbers mean an increase in name-brand reputation, zero indicates no 
change, and negative numbers show a decrease. For example, when a firm changes from an 
auditor with local-reputation to an auditor with international-reputation, the change in the 
auditor quality has a value of two. Similar measures have been applied in other empirical 
studies (e.g., DeFond, 1992). 
                                                
7  Big Five Accounting Firms contains Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, Arthur Andersen, KPMG and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. After the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2001, the Big Five became to Big Four. 
8 Quasi-rents equal the excess of audit fees over the avoidable costs of performing the audit. 
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(2) Auditor Size is highly related to auditor experience and independence. This is another 
proxy for audit quality. A larger auditor with larger offices provides a higher quality than 
smaller ones due to greater in-house experience in administering (e.g. Francis and Yu, 2009). 
Specifically, they are more likely to issue going-concern audit reports and clients of larger 
offices are found to engage in less aggressive earnings management (Francis and Yu, 2009). 
Size can also affect an auditor’s independence. The larger the specific client firm’s fees are in 
relation to the total fees earned by the auditor, the auditor will be less willing to disclose a 
breach, for fear of losing the client (DeAngelo, 1981b). In particular, large auditors (with a 
greater number of clients) have ‘more to lose’ by failing to report a discovered breach in a 
particular client's records. When the size of the new auditor is comparable with, or significantly 
larger than, the incumbent auditor, the audit quality will increase from the improvement of 
independence or experience. The new auditors are believed to be in favour of investors by 
disclosing new private information about the client, such as the reinsurance of the quality of 
the financial statement (Teoh, 1992). Following Johnson and Lys (1990), we use auditor’s 
client sales as a proxy for auditor size, because the client’s sales are correlated with the 
auditor’s quasi-rents. We measure changes in auditor size using the ratio of new auditor size 
over the incumbent auditor size. 
(3) Industry-Specialist Auditors: The industry-specialist auditors have greater competency 
and stronger incentives to provide a high-quality service. Specialist auditors intend to maintain 
quasi-specific rents for a brand label9, and have a better understanding and more experience in 
that industry (Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang, 2003; Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995). They 
are more likely to detect and report financial statement errors or fraud, and thus, provide a 
                                                
9 For instance, IPO clients are more likely to choose industry specialised auditors and are willing to pay higher 
fees (Mayhew and Wilkins, 2003). Firms switching between the Big Four auditors experience significant positive 
abnormal returns when the successor auditor is an industry specialist and negative returns when they’re not a 
specialist (Knechel, Naiker, and Pacheco, 2007). 
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higher level of assurance to the audit committee. Industry-specialised auditors, with greatest 
number of clients within an industry, will not jeopardise their reputation for one single client, 
which might cause a decrease in their market share (DeAngelo, 1981). The industry 
membership is classified based on super-sectors (two-digit code) of FTSE Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB), applied in the London Stock Exchange on the Corporate 
Register. Following Abbott and Parker (2000) and Craswell et al. (1995), we measure auditor 
specialisation by the numbers of clients in an industry and estimate each auditor’s market share 
in that industry. An audit firm who serves more than 30 per cent of clients in one industry are 
considered an industry specialist. Firms are then coded as one if the auditor is changed from a 
non-specialist to a specialist, zero if they experience no change in industry specialisation, and 
minus one if they switch from an industry specialist to a non-specialist. 
 Panels B, C, and D of Table 1 report changes in external audit quality measured as name-
brand reputation, auditor size and industry-specialised auditor selection. 
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Table2. Descriptive statistics, correlation coefficients and VIF for main independent variables 
  Mean VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Auditor change 0.12 - 1             
2 Percent_reputable audit committee member 0.29 1.04 0.014 1 
   
 
       
3 Indicator_reputable audit committee 0.41 - 0.006 0.869*** 1 
  
 
       
4 Accounting/Financial expert 0.40 1.03 -0.013 0.102*** 0.136*** 1          
5 Board independence 2.02 1.19 -0.035* -0.060*** -0.033* 0.065*** 1         
6 % Audit committee to Board 0.56 1.34 0.016 0.131*** 0.232*** 0.086*** 0.124*** 1        
7 Log(Board_size) 0.18 2.11 -0.068*** -0.033* 0.016 0.029 0.149*** -0.428*** 1       
8 Leverage 11.71 1.14 -0.013 0.041** 0.035* -0.002 0.064*** -0.094*** 0.151*** 1      
9 Account receivables 0.05 1.05 -0.009 -0.040** -0.035* -0.027 0.048** -0.018 0.079*** -0.016 1     
10 Firm size 11.92 1.07 -0.077*** -0.045** -0.007 0.043** 0.320*** -0.241*** 0.665*** 0.301*** 0.176*** 1    
11 ROA 0.05 2.28 -0.041** -0.031* -0.028 -0.016 0.018 -0.026 0.113*** -0.028 -0.025 0.199*** 1   
12 Delist 0.15 1.01 0.007 0.033* 0.0264 0.010 -0.063*** 0.027 -0.029 -0.033* 0.014 -0.064*** -0.042** 1  
13 CEO turnover 0.14 1.04 0.033* -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 0.040** -0.050** 0.005 0.061*** 0.006 0.039* -0.069*** 0.001 1 
14 Chairman turnover 0.06 1.04 0.042** -0.019 -0.039* 0.010 0.040** -0.079*** 0.010 0.046** 0.016 0.047** -0.040** -0.005 0.177*** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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3.3.3 Independent Variables 
Audit committee’s reputation proxies. It is our main variable of interest and, as elaborated 
previously, we utilise a relatively measure to assess an audit committee member’s reputation 
and aggregate to access the reputation of the audit committee.  A reputable audit committee 
member is defined by who serves on the firm’s audit committee and has at least another board 
seat in a larger listed company (i.e., we compare the size of the enterprise value in each firm in 
which the director serves —“larger” denotes for 10% greater in firm size). Fama and Jensen 
(1983) argue that preserving and enhancing a reputation in the labour market for directorships 
is a primary motivation of directors. Firm size is a natural source of director reputation 
incentives. Previous studies (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; 
Yermack, 2004) suggest that larger firms offer directors advantages with greater visibility, 
higher status reimbursement, and the possibility of gaining additional directorships. Masulis 
and Mobbs (2014) use the relative size of the firms supervised by the independent directors as 
a proxy for their incentives to monitor senior management. 
 The reputation of the audit committee is captured by (A) Percent reputable audit committee 
member as the percentage of reputable audit committee members on an audit committee and 
(B) Indicator Reputable audit committee, a dummy variable which equals one when a listed 
firm has at least one reputable audit committee member, and zero otherwise. Table 2 shows 
that approximately 12% of audit committee members are considered reputable in one listed 
firm, and 28.6% of firm-year observations have at least one reputable member.  
 
3.3.4 Model Development 
To examine the effect of audit committee reputation on the decision to change an auditor, 
we estimate the following logit model using panel data analysis to control for omitted variable 
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bias (Allison, 2009; Wooldridge, 2002). With a binary dependent variable (auditor change or 
not), the model is estimated by conditional logit/fixed-effect, controlling for firm and year fixed 
effects. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year to mitigate the simultaneous endogeneity 
problem. 
 !"#$	 &'()*#"	+ℎ-./01,3 = 	5	(7 + 9	!0":0.*	;0<'*-$=0	&+	>0?$0"1,3@A 	+ Σ	C	+#.*"#=D1.3@A) (1) 
 
where the dependent variable &'()*#"	+ℎ-./01,3  is an indicator variable equalling one for 
firm i changing its external auditor at year t, and zero otherwise. 5(	. ) is the cumulative 
distribution function of the logit distribution. The main variable of interest is !0"	:0.*	;0<'*-$=0	&+	>0?$0"1,3@A. Our main hypothesis is that the proportion of reputable 
audit committee members positively affects the probability of an auditor change, in other words, 9 > 0.  
 To examine whether an audit committee consisting of more reputable members demand for 
a higher quality audit, we estimate Equation (2) 
 +ℎ-./0D	).	-'()*	I'-=)*J1,3@A = 	7 + 9	!0":0.*	;0<'*-$=0	&+	>0?$0"1,3@A 	+ Σ	C	+#.*"#=D1.3@A,	 
(2) 
 
where the dependent variable  +ℎ-./0D	).	-'()*	I'-=)*J1,3@A  is measured as (1) changes related 
to name-brand reputation, (2) changes in auditor size and (3) changes related to auditor’s 
industry specialisation. By definition, changes related to name-brand reputation and changes 
related to auditor’s industry specialisation are ordinal variables, and both of them have more 
than two levels, so we apply the fixed-effects ordered logit model with the Blow-Up and 
Cluster (BUC) estimator (Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelmann, 2015). Furthermore, as the 
changes in auditor size is defined as a continuous variable, a fixed-effect model is employed 
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(Wooldridge, 2002). We expect that auditor quality to be positively related to the Percent 
Reputable AC Member. 
 A number of board/audit committee and firm characteristics that may affect firm auditor 
change have been controlled for in our analysis. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics and 
pairwise correlations for the variables in the panel data regression. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is estimated to examine the severity of multicollinearity. The magnitudes of VIF are 
generally small—all are less than 2.28—indicating that the probability of multicollinearity is 
relatively low in Table 2. The definitions of main variables are provided in Appendix A. 
Board and audit committee level controls. For board and director characteristics, we control 
for board independence, board size, accounting/financial expert, and per cent of audit 
committee to board (Badolato et al., 2013; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014). CEO-Chair 
duality and executives on the audit committee are rare (less than 0.5%) in the UK. Thus, they 
are not included as controls.  
Firm level controls. Prior literature suggests that the likelihood of an auditor change is 
positively related to leverage (debt over total assets) because firms have more demand for a 
quality auditor to reduce the cost of debt with increases in the debt level to illustrate financial 
statement credibility (Copley, Doucet, and Gaver, 1994) and reduce agency costs (DeFond, 
1992). To control the auditor/client relationship, the firm size and growth respect (ROA) are 
incorporated (Reynolds and Francis, 2000). We also control the effects of accruals on auditor 
changes (Accruals) (Defond and Subramanyam, 1998). 
 Firm events controls. Previous studies indicate that there is an increased probability of an 
auditor change in turnovers of top management (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995), financial distress, 
or extreme contraction (Johnson and Lys, 1990; Schwartz and Menon, 1985). Thus, we control 
for firm events including CEO turnover, Chairman turnover, and Delisting (including takeovers, 
foreign registration and voluntary liquidation). 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Auditor Change 
Table 3 presents regressions results for the effect of audit committee reputation on external 
auditor change based on Equation (1). The dependent variable, Auditor Change, is an indicator 
variable that equals one when the firm changes its auditor and zero otherwise. The coefficient 
of the explanatory variable, Percent reputable audit committee member, in Model (1) is 
significant and positive. This suggests that an auditor change is more likely to occur when the 
audit committee has more reputable members. We also find significantly positive coefficient 
on Indicator reputable audit committee in Model (2). Overall, our results show an increased 
probability of auditor change when audit committee members are more reputable. 
 Table 3 shows that there is a negative relationship between board size and auditor change. 
The effect of board size on firm value and corporate governance is inconclusive under different 
corporate governance system, institutional environment and culture (Eisenberg, Sundgren and 
Wells, 1998; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012; Yermack, 1996). Studies based on UK data find that 
the boards of directors tend to play an advisory role, rather than monitoring role. They find that 
board size has a negative influence on firm outcomes such as accounting profitability, Tobin’s 
Q and stock returns, particularly in larger firms (Guest, 2008, 2009; John and Senbet, 1998).  
Consistent with the prior literature (Hennes, Leone and Miller, 2014), leverage has a 
positively significant effect on auditor change. We argue that this is a consequence from the 
increase in agency costs between debt-holders and shareholders (also managers). Managers 
could take various actions to transfer wealth from debt-holders to shareholders, so debt-holders 
often use covenant based on accounting information to reduce these transfers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Debt-holders with more debt-holding demand for more monitoring and more 
reliable accounting information provided by external auditing. 
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Table 3. The role of audit committee member’s reputation on auditor changes 
 Dependent variable: Auditor change 
    (1)     (2) 
Percent_reputable audit committee member 1.205**  
 (0.61)  
Indicator_reputable audit committee  0.616** 
  (0.31) 
Accounting/Financial expert 0.066 0.066 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
% Audit committee to Board 1.043 0.712 
 (1.14) (1.16) 
Log(Board_size) -1.396** -1.469** 
 (0.69) (0.72) 
Board independence  0.169 0.158 
 (1.31) (1.30) 
Leverage 1.918* 1.983* 
 (1.12) (1.12) 
Account receivables -1.056 -0.985 
 (2.19) (2.19) 
Firm size 0.429 0.444 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
ROA 0.238 0.204 
 (1.36) (1.35) 
Delist 0.234 0.207 
 (0.50) (0.50) 
CEO Turnover 0.188 0.177 
 (0.27) (0.27) 
Chair Turnover 0.156 0.164 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
Firm & Year fix effect Yes Yes 
N 812 812 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0807 0.0811 
(a) ***, **, * denote for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
(b) Definitions of explanatory and control variables are provided in Appendix A. 
  
Personnel change of CEO and Chairman doesn’t have a significant effect on audit change. 
This is inconsistent with the evidence documented in the US by Beattie and Fearnley (1995) 
and Johansen and Pettersson (2013). This partly supports our perception that auditor changes 
in the UK are mainly driven by the audit committee as their responsibilities are clearly defined 
since the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee (1992). The other control variables 
such as Board independence, Firm size and Delist, are not significant. 
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Overall, our results suggest that firms with a high proportion of reputable audit committee 
members have higher chances to change the external auditor. 
 
3.4.2 Changes in Audit-Quality  
 In this section, we exam whether highly reputable audit committees demand for a higher-
quality auditor who has a higher capability and incentives in discovering and disclosing 
breaches in a firm’s financial reporting. Table 4 shows the regression results on changes in 
audit quality of three dimensions including name brand, size, and industry expertise based on 
Equation (2). The signs on the coefficients of Percent reputable audit committee members in 
Models (1) and (2) are significant, but not significant in Model (3) despite being positive10. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, the results indicate that when there are more reputable audit 
committee members, firms have a higher likelihood to select audit firms that have a better 
name-brand reputation or larger size.  
 Interestingly, we find that the association between the switch to an industry-specialist 
auditor and the percentage of reputable audit committee members is not significant. The auditor 
market in the UK becomes highly concentrated after 2001; almost all the FT350 firms select 
the Big Four as their auditors. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) is an industry-specialist auditor 
with a market share of more than 30% in 11 out of 15 non-financial industries. The variable, 
industry-specialised auditor, almost becomes a dummy variable with a value of one when a 
listed firm chooses PwC as an auditor and zero otherwise.  
 For some control variables, the signs and strengths of coefficients vary with the choice of 
dependent variables. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Abbott and Parker, 2000; 
                                                
10 The regression results using Indicator reputable audit committee are consistent and are available upon request.  
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DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988) that the associations between the controls and the 
selection of an auditor are sensitive to the proxies employed to measure the auditor’s quality. 
 
Table 4. Audit committee member’ reputation and changes in audit quality 
 Dependent variable: Changes in audit quality 
Independent variables  
(1) 
Name-Brand 
Reputation 
 
(2) 
Auditor Size 
 
(3) 
Industry   
Specialisation 
Percent reputable audit committee 
member 1.788** 0.084** 0.523 
 (0.87) (0.04) (0.65) 
Accounting/Financial expert -0.596* 0.015 -0.049 
 (0.32) (0.04) (0.27) 
Board independence -0.611 -0.062 0.272 
 (2.08) (0.23) (1.41) 
% Audit committee to Board -0.895 0.028 -0.305 
 (1.35) (0.19) (1.17) 
Log(Board_size) 2.526** -0.347*** 0.114 
 (1.07) (0.12) (0.72) 
Leverage -0.874 0.193 -1.171 
 (1.54) (0.18) (1.04) 
Account receivables 0.839 -0.072 7.190** 
 (1.77) (0.38) (3.18) 
Firm size -1.335*** 0.063 -0.143 
 (0.39) (0.05) (0.21) 
ROA 1.788 -0.095 0.444 
 (0.87) (0.14) (2.46) 
Firm & Year fix effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 812 812 812 
R- squared - 0.062 - 
Pseudo R-squared 0.107 - 0.020 
(a) ***, **, * denote for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
(b) Definitions of explanatory and control variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
3.5. Additional Analysis: Auditor Change and Financial-Report Quality 
 In this section, we provide additional analysis to examine whether auditor-change decisions 
by an audit committee/board would enhance the financial reporting quality, anther measure for 
the audit committee effectiveness. Auditing serves to reduce agency costs, such as earnings-
management behaviour by the management (DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988). A 
voluntary auditor change by an effective audit committee/board implies that agency-cost 
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concerns overcome switching costs. Therefore, earnings quality should be improved after 
voluntary auditor changes. The collapse of AA provides a quasi-experiment to identify a 
sample of involuntary auditor changes. 
We adopt the adjusted Jones model (Dechow, 1995) to estimate discretionary accruals (DACC) 
that has been used to estimate the earnings management11. To examine the auditor change’s 
effect on the magnitude of discretionary accruals, we establish the following model: 
 K&++1,3 = 	7 + 	9&'()*#"	:ℎ-./01,3@A + 	Σ	C	:#.*"#=D1,3@A	,							(3) 
 
where &'()*#"	:ℎ-./01,3@A	is a dummy variable that equals one when firm i changes its 
auditor in year t–1 and zero otherwise. The control variables contain firm size, total accruals, 
and operating cash flows and leverage, which may affect the degree of DACC (Ding and Jia, 
2012; Jenkins et al., 2006). For firms with voluntary auditors changes, 9 is expected to be 
negative, which indicates the auditor change reduces the level of DACC; while for firms with 
involuntary changes, 9 is not assumed to be significant. 
 Table 5 provides the regression results for the effect of voluntary and involuntary auditor 
changes on earnings management (DACC). Given that involuntary auditor changes occurred 
only over the period of 2001 to 2003 due to the collapse of AA, we estimate Equation (3) by 
using the sample of voluntary and involuntary changes from 2001 to 2005, respectively Models 
(1) and (2). Model (3) presents the results over the entire study period from 2001 to 2009.  
 
 
 
                                                
11 The method of estimating the DACC can be found in Appendix B.   
 47 
Table 5. Effects of voluntary and involuntary auditor changes on earnings management  
 (1) From 2001-2005 
(2) 
From 2001-2005 
(3) 
From 2001-2009 
    
Voluntary Auditor Change -0.019*  -0.018*** 
 (-1.78)  (-2.84) 
Involuntary Auditor Change          0.020  
  (0.96)  
Leverage 0.097 0.144 0.060** 
 (0.90) (1.11) (2.27) 
Cash flow -0.097 -0.488** -0.322 
 (-0.78) (-2.65) (-0.92) 
Firm size -0.027 -0.030 -0.019*** 
 (-1.08) (-1.04) (-2.73) 
Total accruals -0.273 -0.190 -0.155** 
 (-1.50) (-1.42) (-2.57) 
Year and firm fix effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 174 189 816 
adj. R2 0.283 0.136 0.230 
(a) ***, **, * denote for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
(b) Definitions of explanatory and control variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 The coefficients of voluntary auditor change are significantly negative, around -0.018, both 
in Models (1) and (3). This suggests that DACC has a negative relationship with voluntary 
auditor changes, indicating a substantial effect of voluntary auditor changes in enhancing 
earnings quality. However, the coefficient of involuntary auditor change is not significant in 
Model (2), indicating that the voluntary auditor change could not reduce the DACCs. Hence, 
it fails to improve the earnings quality of the listed firms. 
The insignificant effect of involuntary changes could be explained by two reasons. First, firms 
in normal circumstances are less likely to engage in earnings management, so DACCs would 
not change in response to exogenous involuntary auditor changes. The second reason is that 
the name-brand change does not necessarily mean that the relationship between the auditing 
team and the client is broken. Due to the merger of Deloitte and AA, most of the AA staff in 
the UK transferred to Deloitte in 2002 and 2003 (The Guardian, 2002). Our data reveals that 
of AA’s 66 clients, 47 were to get audited by Deloitte. The other 19 clients picked one of the 
other Big Three as auditors.  
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 Overall, our findings provide evidence of improvements in financial reporting only in firms 
with voluntary auditor changes. This is consistent with studies in the US market (Blouin, Grein, 
and Rountree, 2007; Myers, Myers, and Omer, 2003). Our results do not support the call for a 
mandatory auditor rotation by the EU audit reform in 2016. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 This study has investigated the role of reputation for the audit committee on auditor change 
using data from UK listed firms. We find that the likelihood of auditor change increases with 
the proportion of audit committee reputable members. Furthermore, audit committee members 
with a higher reputation demand for higher audit auditors. We constructed three proxies for 
audit quality: name-brand reputation, size and industry-specialisation. The proportion of 
reputable members is positively related to the commonly used measures for audit quality, 
except for the industry-specialisation. The results suggest that reputation plays an important 
role in making audit committee members work diligently to improve the quality of financial 
reporting by changing auditors. Higher reputable audit committee members have more 
reputation incentives and influence to push through the idea of changing an auditor and 
choosing an auditor who provides a higher audit quality to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the management and shareholders. Taking advantage of involuntary auditor changes 
among the clients of Arthur Andersen (AA), who failed in 2001, we compare the effects of 
voluntary and involuntary auditor changes on the absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent 
with the findings based on the US market (Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Myers, Myers, and Omer, 
2003), only voluntary auditor changes are found to have a positive effect on earnings quality. 
In other words, only auditor changes initiated by the internal necessity are effective in reducing 
earnings management. 
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 Our study contributes to the literature on auditor change, audit committee effectiveness, and 
reputation incentives in corporate governance by linking the director reputation with auditor 
change for the very first time. Prior studies examined the effect of audit committee composition 
and activities on audit-quality selection. Our examination, involving audit committee 
reputation, provides a clearer setting for understanding the effectiveness of the audit committee 
regarding auditor change. Prior research treated non-executive directors’ responsibility equally, 
investigating how boards affect firm performance. However, whether the increase in firm value 
comes from board monitoring or the advisory channel is not clear. In fact, the ability and 
experience of individual directors on a board are diversified and they are appointed to a board 
to play different roles. This research directly emphasises the monitoring role of boards and 
tests the relationship between the effectiveness of their task and the motivation of individual 
directors. 
 The research has some important implications for regulators and policymakers. This study 
highlights the effect of reputation concerns (losing current/potential directorships) on 
motivating directors’ due diligence. It calls for more regulatory guidance to clarify the authority 
and accountability for boards of directors. Furthermore, the question of whether mandatory 
auditor rotation leads to improved earnings quality is still debatable. In response to the call for 
a mandatory auditor rotation by the EU/UK audit reform in 2016, regulators should be cautious 
in their implementation. They should leave firms with enough flexibility to achieve the trade-
off between agency benefits and switching costs. Our research is subject to some limitations. 
The findings are based on the analysis of only UK data, so cautions need to be taken to 
generalise the results to other markets, considering ownership structure and institutional 
environments.   
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       Appendix A Variable definitions and summary statistics in detail.  
		    Definition             N Mean Median Std. 
Board Characteristics      
 
Percent reputable audit 
committee member 
The number of reputable members over the size of audit committee 
998 0.120 0.000 0.221 
 
Indicator reputable audit 
committee  
A dummy variable that equals one if an audit committee has at least 
one reputable member  998 0.286 0.000 0.452 
 
Accounting/Financial 
expert 
A dummy variable that equals one if at least one member in the audit 
committee has working experience as an accountant partner or as an 
CFO 
998 0.405 0.000 0.491 
 Board Independence The number of non-executive directors over the size of the board 998 0.559 0.571 0.147 
 
% Audit committee to 
Board 
The percentage of audit committee member on board 998 0.403 0.400 0.137 
 Log(Board_size) The logarithm of the number of directors on board 998 2.022 2.079 0.319 
Firm Features      
 Leverage Total debt over total assets 998 0.559 0.573 0.216 
 Account receivable Total account receivables divided by total assets 998 0.179 0.151 0.142 
 Firm size The logarithm of firms’ total assets 998 11.915 11.737 1.773 
 ROA Net income over total assets  998 0.050 0.066 0.156 
       
Firm Events      
 
Delist A dummy variable that equals one if a firm is delisted. Delisting reasons 
include takeovers (account for over 85%), foreign registration, and 
voluntary liquidation 
998 0.049 0.000 0.215 
 CEO Turnover A dummy variable that equals one if a CEO turnover occurs 998 0.150 0.000 0.357 
  Chair Turnover A dummy variable that equals one if a Chairman turnover occurs 998 0.135 0.000 0.341 
Discretionary accruals       
 
DACC The DACCs (discretionary accruals) are the absolute value of the  
regression residual by estimating a performance-adjusted modified 
Jones model (see Appendix B ) 
998 0.059 0.049 0.094 
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Appendix B DACC Estimation 
Accounting literature often uses discretionary accruals as an applicable proxy for earnings 
quality/management (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Kim, Park, and Wier, 2012). This 
is because manipulating earnings with accruals is a key approach for earnings management. 
Discretionary accruals reflect the extent to which managers are tolerable to “adjusting” accruals, 
highly related to manipulating earnings. Following Dechow et al. (1995), we measure non-
discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional industry variation of a performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model.  
It is expected that non-discretionary accruals occur in the normal business transactions, no 
matter whether earnings-management happens, and is highly related to a firm’s economic 
characteristics. Consequently, non-discretionary accruals should be estimated by a function of 
firm’s revenues, account receivables, operation cash flow, the level of property, plants and 
equipment and firm performance. Then, estimations are adjusted for industry and time effects. 
Lastly, discretionary accruals are equal to the difference between total accruals and the 
estimation of non-discretionary accruals. The DACC (discretionary accruals) are the absolute 
value of the residuals in the following model: 
 !"##$%,'!"$%,'() = 	,)%,' 	 1!"$%,'() + ,/%,' 	 ∆1232452$%,' − 	∆1272839:;2<$%,'!"$%,'()  +,=%,' 	 >>?$%,'!"$%,'() +	,@%,' 	 A2B	847CD2$%,'!"$%,'() + E$%,' 
 
where !"##$%,' is the total accruals (net income from continuing operations minus operating 
cash flows) for firm i in industry j for year t. !"$%,'()is the total assets for firm i in industry j 
for year t-1. ∆1232452$%,' is the revenue difference of current year and one lagged year for 
firm i in industry j. ∆1272839:;2<$%,' is the accounts receivable change previous year. >>?$%,' 
is the gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in industry j. E$%,' is the residual from 
regression for firm i in industry j for year t. DACC is measured as the absolute value of E$%,' , 
reflecting the magnitudes of abnormal accruals, consistent with empirical studies (Jenkins, 
Kane, and Velury, 2006; Lennox, Wu, and Zhang, 2015). The larger size of DACC signifies 
lower earnings quality. 
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Chapter 3: Board Meeting Frequencies on Various Topics  
and Corporate Governance: Evidence from China 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper examines the relationship between numbers of topic-specific board meetings and 
efficiency of corporate governance. Quality of corporate governance is proxied by CEO 
turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. The measures of numbers 
of topics-specific meeting are calculated based on the reports of independent directors of 
Chinese listed firms over the period of 2005 to 2015. We document that directors meet more 
often to discuss growth strategies for the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions can 
increase the CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. Moreover, more discussing the 
nomination of directors and top management decrease the sensitivities of CEO turnover and 
compensation to performance. It sheds light on what makes boards more effective, and how 
board monitoring of different decisions at board meetings modifies the connection between 
CEO interests and firm performance.  
 
 
 
JEL classification: G30; G34 
Keywords: Board Effectiveness, Board Meeting Topics, Agency Costs, CEO Compensation, 
CEO Dismissal 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
A growing body of corporate governance literature focuses on the duties and functions of 
boards of directors who play an important role in corporate governance to mitigate agency 
problems. Without boards’ monitoring, management teams may take self-benefit actions, and 
deviate from the interests of residual claimants (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Particularly, the intensity of board activities is believed to be beneficial to 
firms, at least from regulators’ point for view. Since introduction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
(2002) in the US, a minimum number of board meetings has been required in many markets 
(e.g., U.K. and India). In addition, the actual number of board meetings has to be disclosed in 
listed firms’ annual reports. One question that needs to be asked, however, is how board activity 
influence corporate governance.   
 Numerous empirical studies of board function use number of board meetings to proxy for 
board monitoring intensity (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Dou, Sahgal, and Zhang, 2015; 
Goergen, Limbach, and Scholz, 2015). Directors who meet more frequently are more likely to 
spend more time in the served firm and carry out their duties  (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Vafeas 
(1999) and Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find that the meeting frequency has a positive 
impact on firm value. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) point out that inefficient routine 
meetings could be held primarily to satisfy the requirements of firm hierarchy and regulation. 
Some studies shows that more board meetings and higher director attendance in the meetings 
do not effectively prevent management’s opportunistic behaviours (e.g. Lo, Wong, and Firth, 
2010).  
 One of the limitations with previous research is that it fails to consider that board meetings 
contain various components. Different proposals typically initiated by the management have 
to be discussed to obtain ratifications from directors. Boards of directors put most of their effort 
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into monitoring sundry management decisions: business strategy, risk oversight, board 
composition and CEO succession planning (e.g. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013; Stiles, 
2001). 1  Board activities related to processing corporate decisions are more effective to 
demonstrate how directors fulfil their monitoring obligations, ruling out the noise from routine 
meetings. Indeed, meetings on different topics provide various means to re-evaluate CEO and 
firm performance in corresponding dimensions. To shed light on importance of board meeting 
agenda, we use the number and type of meetings to proxy for board activities to monitor various 
proposals. This approach allows us to investigate how board meetings on specific topics affect 
quality of corporate governance. 
 Quality of corporate governance is measured by two proxies, namely turnover-performance 
and compensation-performance sensitivities. Boards of directors are in charge of monetary 
incentives and the threat of dismissal, keeping managers on their toes by aligning managerial 
benefits with the firm’s interests (Tirole, 2001). Board meetings provide a chance for directors 
to monitor and discuss strategies to improve firm’s and the executives’ performance (e.g. 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Agency models prescribe normative actions so that compensation 
is related to effort and performance and that the board fires poor performing CEOs. However, 
some empirical research might find the opposite effect.2  
                                                
1 Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) examine the managerial and supervisory theories of board effectiveness, 
using private data obtained by inspecting the minutes of real-world board meetings in 11 Israeli business 
companies during 2007-2009, including 155 board meetings, 247 board committee meetings, and 2,459 decisions 
made. Stiles (2001) tests these two theories by analysing data from 51 interviews with directors of UK public 
firms, 121 board secretaries and 4 case studies of UK public firms. 
2 In pay-firm performance literature, this is no such simple relationship in reality: many studies have found a 
negative relationship between excess compensation and firm performance (e.g. Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 2006); 
the CEO pay-performance sensitivity was mainly dependent on firm’s reward to the top management team(e.g. 
Carpenter and Sanders, 2002).  
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 China provides us with a unique framework for looking at the missing relationships between 
board activities and the reduction of agency costs. The internal governance system is 
endogenously determined based on firm’s contracting and operating environments (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003). Hence, no clear evidence in the U.S. supports boards work actively to 
protect the investors’ interests. Like other emerging markets, the legal protection for investor 
rights and accounting standards in China are less-developed than ones in the U.S. Studies that 
use data of these markets often document a positive association between board effectiveness 
and firm performance. It suggests that the internal governance mechanisms are a possible 
substitution for external mechanisms in these countries (e.g. Ferreira and Matos, 2008), and 
become more consequential as well.  
 To offset the defect of external governance mechanisms for Chinese listed firms, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) emphasises the monitoring role of independent 
director system from 2001. CSRC also introduced a practice3 that differs from those adopted 
in developed markets. That is, independent directors are obliged to issue Report[s] of the 
Independent Director after meetings, in order to publicly release topics discussed and their 
opinions on important board decisions. Many empirical research focusing on board 
characteristics in China documents that board of director is an important corporate governance 
mechanism regardless their ownership structure (Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006; Kato and 
Long, 2006a; Liu et al., 2015).  
 The reports are a novel way to enrich corporate disclosure and board accountability in 
decision making. The CSRC and new Corporate Law require reports to be independent and 
objective. Using listed firms’ reports, we capture independent directors’ task-based activities 
                                                
3 The new corporate governance guidelines for Chinese listed firms (2001, 2002). 
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on six major topics, explicitly personnel changes, compensation, financial reports and audit, 
firm control transactions, changes of equity structure, and growth strategies.  
 We apply panel data techniques to explore the moderating effects of specific topics 
discussed at board meetings on the sensitivity between CEOs’ dismissal/compensation and 
firm performance. Furthermore, we extend our analysis by employing the instrumental variable 
(IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches to mitigate endogeneity issues. 
Our key findings show that CEO dismissals and compensation are related to firm performance 
in China, suggesting that boards of directors are effective, at least to some extent, in contracting 
and monitoring executives. Regarding CEO compensation and its relationship to firm 
performance, the pay-performance sensitivity is strengthened by additional board monitoring 
efforts in discussions of firms’ growth strategies (i.e. investments and acquisitions). The 
relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance is weaker when there is more board 
monitoring activity on the nomination of directors and top management.  
 Next, we investigate whether effects of board activities vary under different ownership 
structures. The majority of China’s listed firms are privatised former state-owned enterprises 
with very unique ownership structures. They are controlled by either state owners or legal 
person owners (private firms). We find that the mediation effect of nomination meetings is 
positive and significant in private firms but insignificant in state-controlled firms. Further, the 
mediation effect of growth strategy meetings is stronger in private firms than that in state-
owner firms. The results reflect the divergence of primary motives of the controlling owners. 
State owners have political and economic considerations, while legal person owners are mainly 
profit-driven (Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui, 2006). 
 Our research contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature that examines board effectiveness and influence upon firm performance. Most studies 
in the field of board effectiveness have only focused on board characteristics, and draw 
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inferences that board characteristics could affect their activities, and ultimately impact firm 
value. However, few writers have been able to draw on any systematic research into board 
activities on different topics affects the practice of corporate governance. We show that board 
activities related to different strategic decisions can alter the relationship between CEO 
interests and firm performance.  
  Second, we contribute to the dynamic debate among academics and practitioners as to 
whether board meetings are meaningful. This study provides novel empirical evidence on 
linking boards’ decision performance with governance at the firm level. Moderately consistent 
with the prediction of the board process model that board task performance can improve firm 
performance (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), some meetings have positive effects on corporate 
governance, although meetings with different foci have different effects. We also avoid the 
noise present in the annual meeting frequency measure used in previous empirical studies 
(Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). 
 Last but not least, we extend the literature on the endeavor to achieve better corporate 
governance in a major emerging economy. In an environment with weak investor protection, 
centralized ownership, and an ineffective takeover market, the heavy burden of solving agency 
problems in China lies on the shoulders of directors, and mainly independent directors. We 
provide novel evidence on the effectiveness of the recently adopted independent director 
system and their reports, whereas prior studies only address inferences about board 
composition and structure. Our findings call for policies that encourage directors to put more 
effort into monitoring firms’ strategic decisions and the link between CEO incentives and firm 
performance, instead of focusing on the number of board meetings alone. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide the 
institutional background and literature review. The following two sections describe the sample 
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data and explain the research design. The penultimate section contains the empirical results 
and discussion. The final section presents our conclusions and discusses areas for further study. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
2.2.1 Institutional Background and Corporate Governance in China 
 
China’s economic reform began with the study of the modern corporate governance system of 
western countries. In 1992, China introduced Germany’s two-tier board system, consisting of 
a main board and a supervisory board. In most stated-owned enterprises (SOEs), the 
government had a significant impact on the nominations and appointments for both boards. 
The top management of firms worked as bureaucrats, and the supervisory boards had little 
motivation and ambiguous accountability when it came to monitoring managers and firm 
operations (Allen et al., 2005; Conyon and He, 2011).  
 In order to deepen the economic reforms and protect the interests of minority shareholders, 
the CSRC mimicked the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in adopting new corporate governance 
mechanisms from 2001 onwards. It issued guidelines and regulations (2001, 2002) that 
compelled each listed firm to have independent directors on its main board and to improve the 
quality of its information disclosure. The proportion of independent directors was required to 
be at least one third by June 2003, while independent directors were required to publish the 
Report of the Independent Director after board meetings (CSRC, 2001). As a result, the 
protection of public shareholder interests and the transparency of information disclosure have 
been improved (CSRC, 2004).  
 One year later, the independent directors’ system gained legal status for the first time, when 
it was authorized in the new Company Law of China (2005). Independent directors, as a group 
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of corporate agents, are not affiliated with the listed firm or the controlling shareholders, and 
‘shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being 
infringed’ (CSRC, 2002). Furthermore, they are legally liable for disclosing fraud and 
irregularities of listed firms through the Report of the Independent Director. The report must 
clearly state whether each independent director agrees with important managerial proposals 
discussed in the board meeting. Specifically, it is mandatory that they report how they voted 
on different types of firm decision (CSRC, 2001).  
 These reports provide a unique dataset from China to study corporate boards that are 
typically black boxes. From the dissent votes of these report, recent studies show that 
independent directors’ dissent is a valid signal of the presence of effective corporate 
governance. Dissension is eventually rewarded in the marketplace in the form of more outside 
directorships and a lower risk of regulatory sanctions (Jiang, Wan, and Zhao, 2016; Ma and 
Khanna, 2016; Tang, Du, and Hou, 2013). The reports could be seen as an intense reflection 
of board monitoring by the independent directors. 
   
2.2.2 CEO Dismissal, Compensation, Performance, and Boards 
 
 The board of directors, the “ultimate internal monitor”, plays an important role in evaluating 
CEOs and disciplining them (Fama, 1980). The board is responsible for designing a 
compensation contract that will motivate the CEO, rewarding acceptable firm performance, 
and punishing (and in extreme cases, dismissing) the CEO for poor performance. Research on 
the subject has been mostly restricted to investigate how board composition and features 
influence the relationships between CEO rewards and firm performance. These characteristics 
include independent director composition (Dah, Frye, & Hurst, 2014; Guthrie, Sokolowsky, & 
Wan, 2012; Weisbach, 1988), board size (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Yermack, 1996), 
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CEO-chairman duality (Goyal and Park, 2002; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), female and minority-
group directors on the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Carter, 2010), reputation (e.g. 
Shivdasani, 1993), and work background (e.g. for academia experience see Francis, Hasan, and 
Wu, 2015) of board members. 
 The literature typically documents that CEO dismissal (compensation) is negatively 
(positively) related to firm performance (e.g. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Defond and 
Hung, 2004; Denis and Denis, 1995; Kaplan and Minton, 2012). However, the pay/dismissal-
to-performance sensitivity can in practice be weakened or eliminated by competition from the 
CEO’s peers within the top management team, board characteristics, ownership structure (e.g. 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2003), institutional environments (e.g. Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997), and even exogenous industry and market shocks (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 
2015). 
  Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that the associations between CEO monetary incentives 
or dismissal and performance are statistically significant, but they may be economically too 
small to actually discipline CEO’s behaviours. They also hypothesize that public and private 
political forces impose constraints on incentives, which weaken the relationships. Recently, 
Kaplan and Minton (2012) found that annual CEO turnover-performance sensitivity was higher 
for the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2000-2007) than estimated in previous studies.   
In summary, the evidence presented thus supports the idea that board composition could 
potentially affecting the way board operates, then affect firm level outcome. Our study provides 
new systematic evidence on how various types of board activities on different proposals 
directly affect quality of corporate governance.  
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2.2.3 Board of non-executive director and CEO Dismissal, Compensation in China 
 
 One increase concern in China’s context is entrenched managers: whether internal corporate 
governance mechanisms work to dismiss underperformed CEOs who are often affiliated with 
the controlling shareholders). In SOEs, one scenario is that independent directors are 
representatives of the controlling shareholders (government or government agents) (Firth,  
Fung, and Rui, 2006). Firm profitability is not the only goal of controlling shareholders, so 
independent directors will not dismiss CEO in poor performed firms. It is in line with 
controlling shareholders’ interests, while conflicting with minority shareholders’ interests. The 
other scenario is that independent directors (political connected directors) are not independent, 
because they have more career concerns in political related markets rather than in the 
professional manager pool. In non-SOEs, the managers (Chairmen) are often the controlling 
shareholders themselves. Hence, it is almost impossible to replace the entrench managers. 
Since the early 2000s China's public firms have been under pressure from investors to reform 
(Allen et al., 2005), the institutional context may change. New empirical studies are needs to 
investigate the whether independent directors could play the effective discipline role.  
 The empirical literature on CEO dismissal and compensation in China mostly shows that 
both the turnover-performance and compensation-performance relationships are statistically 
significant (e.g. Bai and Xu, 2005; Conyon and He, 2011, 2014; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006; 
Kato and Long, 2006b). However, the statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients 
may vary, depending on which performance measures are used. 
Empirical research documents mixed results of the influence of outside director on top 
executive turnover. In addition, they often measure board independence by the ratio of 
independent directors on board, and test whether board independence enhance the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity. Kato and Long (2006) find that the presence of independent 
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directors will enhance turnover- performance link using data on China’s listed firms from 1999 
to 2002. Conyon and He (2011) argue that that non-State (private) controlled firms and firms 
with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor 
performance from 2001 to 2005. In contrast, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006) show that the 
turnover-performance sensitivity is lower if more independent directors on board. Furthermore, 
CEO turnover are more likely to associate with accounting performance, not with market-based 
performance (Conyon and He, 2014). 
Some studies also examine the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance as a 
complementary reward mechenisam to dismissal threat. Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007) using data 
on 1998 to 2000 find that CEO compensation in China are more likely to link to firm accounting 
performance (ROA) rather than market performance. State ownership reducs compensation-
for-performance sensitivity. Firms with a lot of non-executive directors are more likely to use 
performance-based pay, and a firm that has a joint CEO/chairman position is less likely to use 
performance-based pay. Conyon and He (2011) find that firms with more independent directors 
on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link from 2001 to 2005. 
In summary, previous empirical studies often use board composition (the ratio of 
independent director, political connected director etc.) to measure internal governance quality 
with short panel data. 
 
2.2.4 Topic-Focused Board Meetings and Corporate Governance 
 
On one hand, board meeting are the most usual occasion for the board of directors to exchange 
and discuss ideas in order to fulfil their responsibilities (Conger et al., 1998).  Interactions and 
communications in board meeting can increase the efficiency with which boar tasks are 
performed (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). From this point of view, the more frequent the 
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meetings, the better monitoring and control which lead to better corporate governance outcome. 
On the other hand, the meeting of the boards are not all synonymous with efficiency. Some 
routine tasks fixed by the CEO might take up a larger portion of the time. Thus, more meetings 
don’t necessarily imply better monitoring. Previous studies on board meetings most often 
depict board meetings as rather homogeneous and monolithic. They find that poor performance 
cause a higher frequency of board meetings, while number of board meetings  have no effects 
on CEO turnover/compensation performance sensitivities (Adams, 2005; Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). However, not all meetings are the same. Recent studies 
have shown significant variations in the ways in which board meetings are run. Ocasio and 
Joseph (2005) suggest that the topics on which boards focus, and even the board routines, can 
vary remarkably between corporations, with the micro-processes and topics covered potentially 
revealing large differences between boards. Therefore, it’s important to investigate specific 
topics discussed at board meetings as well as the ways they influence corporate governance 
efficiency. 
 
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
We perform our analysis on a sample of non-financial firms listed on the Main Boards of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period of 2005-2015. We obtained other 
financial and corporate governance information from the CSMAR. We applied a number of 
screening procedures to our initial dataset. First, we excluded financial firms, because their 
regulations and accounting standards are dissimilar to those for other firms. Second, we only 
included those firms with at least three consecutive fiscal years of capital market and financial 
statement data. Third, to alleviate the influence of extreme values, all firm-level financial data 
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were winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. This screening process yielded 10,239 firm-year 
observations over seven years. 
 The public release of Report of the Independent Director began in 2001, and became 
compulsory in 2003. During 2003-2005, the reports were issued by listed firms ‘voluntarily’ 
as the CSRC requirements for issuing such reports were not explicit. The Information 
Disclosure Standards (CSRC, 2005) further clarified the disclosure requirements, improving 
the quality and quantity of the reports. After 2005, the number of independent directors’ reports 
increased accordingly.  For each report, the CSMAR recodes the firm’s stock code, the issuing 
date, the topics discussed, the independent directors’ opinions, and the entire contents of the 
report (see Appendix A for an example of an independent directors’ report).  
 Due to the difficulty to access corporate boards, there is no empirical research with large 
samples, which could provide evidence of what topics are important and useful to improve 
corporate governance. The unique practice of the Report of the Independent Director in China 
provides a large dataset about board meeting topics. There is often more than one topic 
discussed at a board meeting. We use the frequency with which a topic is discussed at board 
meetings, over a year, as the proxy for board monitoring activity on this particular topic. 
 The column 1 of Table 1 shows mandatory disclosure subjects in the reports recorded in the 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database. Based on the content and 
roles of these topics in corporate governance, we group them into six major topics (Column 2 
of Table 1).4 
 
                                                
4  Tang et al. (2013) use similar categorization of topics to compose major topics. We also estimate using meeting 
number of eleven groups in robustness tests. Our main results are unchanged. 
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2.3.1 Types of board meetings 
 
Nomination. A role typically associated with the board of directors is control of the process by 
which top executives are hired, promoted, assessed and dismissed if necessary. Nomination 
decisions of board members and top management may also reflect the dynamics of CEO and 
the board power. If the board is weak, the CEO turnover and salary might not be significantly 
related to firm performance (Boyd, 1994; Weisbach, 1988).  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
find that CEO involvement in the selection of directors is a mechanism used by CEOs to reduce 
the monitoring from the board.  
Compensation. The board is also responsible for keeping the levels of remuneration sufficient 
to attract, retain and motivate directors. Empirical studies often state a weak or insignificant 
association between CEO compensation and firm performance (e.g. Core et al., 1999). 
Although boards of directors are supposed to monitor the excess compensation of executives, 
they hardly to confront management except when it comes to fire management.  Brick, Palmon, 
and Wald (2006) find that a significant positive relationship between CEO and director 
compensation. They also find evidence that excess compensation (both directors and CEO) is 
associated with firm underperformance, indicating mutual back scratching or cronyism of CEO 
and directors.  
Financial reports, audit and corporate control. The board of directors are also responsible for 
oversight internal control, approval of financial statements and report to the shareholders. The 
“financial reports and audit” topic includes meetings on issuing/amending annual reports, 
auditors’ reports and auditor changes. “Corporate control transactions” involves related-party 
transactions, loan guarantees, and the disposal of assets. These transactions may be associated 
with a manager’s or controlling blockholder’s “tunneling or propping” behaviour which can 
harm shareholders’ interest (e.g. Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011). Board meetings on these topics 
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help the board fulfil their disciplinary role to reduce the probability of financial frauds and 
managers’ tunnelling behaviour.  
 
Table 1 
Specific Topics of Board Meetings in Chinese Public Firms. This table reports the specific major topics 
discussed in the board meetings of Chinese listed firms. The eleven categories (by CSMAR code) of 
meetings are based on the Code of Corporate Governance in China (2001). We combine some topics 
as they have similar effects. 
 
 
Growth strategies. Setting strategic direction of the company is another role the board serves 
(Demb and Neubauer, 1992). The board make decision about issues that are critical and 
strategic such as acquiring a new firm, divesting a division or negotiating a takeover bid 
(Baysinger and Bulter, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Minichilli et al., 2009). Meetings on 
growth strategies include the use of IPO proceeds, investments and acquisitions, investment 
Major topics CSMAR code 
(According to CSRC 
requirements) 
Notes 
Nomination Personnel – 1 Director and officer selection, 
appointment, and turnover 
Compensation Compensation - 2 Emolument of directors and executives 
Financial reports and 
audit 
Financial report and pay out 
policies - 3 
Audit - 7 
Approval of financial reports, profit 
distribution, amendments and 
supplements of reports, etc; switches of 
auditors, audit opinion; accounting 
treatment and information disclosure 
Corporate control 
transactions 
Related-party transaction - 4 
Loans Guarantees - 5 
Disposal of assets - 10 
Loan guarantees are promises by the 
listed firm (the guarantor) to assume the 
debt obligation of a borrower if that 
borrower defaults; disposal of assets 
means the gain or loss calculated as the 
net disposal proceeds, minus the asset’s 
carrying value. 
Change of equity 
structure 
Ownership changes - 8 
Equity division reform - 11 
 
 
Growth strategies Mergers and acquisitions - 6 
Use of IPO proceeds and 
financing - 9 
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and financing.  Meetings on growth strategies enables boards of directors to re-evaluate CEO 
capability and firm fundamentals. 
Change of equity structure. Our sample period coincides with the split-share-structure reform 
in China. Prior to 2005, listed firms in China were characterised by a split share structure where 
two thirds of the state-owned shares are not tradable. These non-tradable shares are largely 
blamed for some serious corporate governance issues and lack of incentives and manger 
responsibilities under the state-ownership structure. In April 2005, the CSRC initiated the split-
share-structure reform, which enabled state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted 
shares. The meeting decisions may influence a firm’s ownership structure, and eventually cause 
a change in corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Cao, Pan, and Tian, 2011).  
 
2.3.2 Key variables 
 
 CEO Dismissal. The top executive in a Chinese firm is often the chairman (or general 
manager) of the board, who is the legal representative of the firm, works full time, and is 
involved in the firm’s daily decision making (e.g. Conyon and He, 2011; Kato and Long, 
2006a). Consistent with previous studies, we adopt the title of CEO for the top executive to 
avoid confusion. CEO dismissal is coded as a dichotomous variable, which equals one if a CEO 
is forcefully dismissed, and zero otherwise. We exclude voluntary turnovers because of health 
issues or retirement, based on public information (recorded in the CSMAR dataset), retaining 
only the forced ones, in line with previous studies (e.g., Chang and Wong, 2009; You and Du, 
2012).  
 During our sample period, we identify 2,556 forced CEO dismissals among the 14,359 firm-
year observations (Panel A of Table 2). If a firm has two or more turnovers in one fiscal year, 
we only count the last one. The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is approximately 18%, 
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implying an average CEO tenure of less than five years, which is consistent with the study of 
Conyon and He (2014) and similar to the turnover rate in the US (Kaplan and Minton, 2012).  
 CEO Compensation. Executive compensation schemes in China typically include only 
cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Although stock options have been permitted by the CSRC 
since 2005, their adoption in equity compensation is rare: only 1.5% of CEOs received equity 
grants in 2005, climbing to 3.5% in 2010 (Conyon and He, 2012). Empirical studies estimate 
that Chinese executives may receive “perks” from their companies, accounting for 
approximately 15-32% of total compensation, but they are rarely disclosed in financial reports 
and difficult to assess using public data. Hence, compensation in this study is the reported sum 
of cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. The CEO compensation is measured as the average 
compensation of the three highest-paid management executives and directors in a firm, 
consistent with prior research (see e.g. Conyon and He, 2012). 
 Panel A of Table 2 shows that executive compensation has risen rapidly. The amount paid 
in 2015, of about 802,000 RMB (116,500USD), was triple that in 2005 (230,000 RMB / 33,400 
USD). Although the executive compensation is not as high as that in the US, it is ten times the 
average wage of employees in the same industry, according to the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China5.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 http://data.stats.gov.cn/workspace/index?m=hgnd 
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Table 2 
CEO Dismissal, Compensation and Board Meetings. This table reports the rate of CEO dismissal, the executive compensation (the average of the three 
highest-paid executives’ compensation), the annual number of board meetings, and the frequencies of board meetings on major topics, in Chinese public firms 
from 2005 to 2015. In panel A, the CEO dismissals rate refers to the percentage of CEO replacements in the single year in question. Executive compensation 
(000s RMB) is the average compensation of the three highest-paid executives and directors, including basic salary, bonuses, and other benefits. Annual 
number of board meetings expresses the average frequency of board meetings. Panel B shows the frequencies of meetings on the six major topics 
individually: nomination, compensation, management routines, corporate control transaction, change of equity structure, and growth strategies. 
A) Annual CEO dismissal rate, executive compensation and board meeting frequency 
Year Observations CEO dismissal Compensation (RMB 000 s) Annual meeting frequency 
2003 1069 0.19 180.98 7.59 2005 245 0.189 230.904 7.504 
2006 1272 0.189 259.874 8.227 
2007 1247 0.167 357.544 9.874 
2008 1249 0.166 397.479 9.768 
2009 1255 0.163 440.288 8.712 
2010 1307 0.176 524.065 9.010 
2011 1334 0.164 598.143 9.388 
2012 1354 0.140 637.598 9.806 
2013 1352 0.182 684.047 9.158 
2014 1367 0.200 738.408 9.703 
2015 1368 0.219 802.093 10.711 
Total 14359 0.178 528.059 9.277 
B) Meeting frequencies on major topics 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Nomination 1397 450 512 695 687 1169 1223 1312 1716 2061 2305 
Compensation 96 45 35 103 95 255 316 344 548 688 915 
Financial reports and audit 355 296 186 147 232 369 374 643 808 1202 1418 
Corporate control transactions 1381 1337 1531 1815 1834 2293 2142 2818 3138 3240 3502 
Change of equity structure 180 1055 121 63 58 37 11 38 20 8 26 
Growth strategies 119 106 147 209 294 303 474 466 696 817 1342 
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 Topic-Focused Meetings. Panel B of Table 2 documents the meeting frequencies for each 
specific topic. Although the annual number of meetings does not change much (about eight or 
ten meetings per year, see last column of Table 2 panel A), the topics discussed at the meetings 
show significant variation. Since 2005, proposals of firm control transactions (e.g. related-party 
transactions) have been the most frequently discussed topic, almost once or twice per year per 
firm (over 1,300 times across the 1,200 or so firms). The nomination of directors and executives 
is the second most frequent, about once per years per firm. The number of meetings about 
compensation changes increases from 96 in 2005 to 915 in 2015, which is in line with the rapid 
increase in executive compensation over that period. The frequency of meetings on changes in 
equity structure is likely influenced by government policy. In 2005, the CSRC instigated a 
split-share-structure reform, setting a deadline for the end of 2006. As most of the equity 
structure changes were related to non-tradable shares owned by SOEs or government agencies 
being transferred to tradable shares, the frequency of meetings on equity structure changes 
peaked at 1,055 in the year 2006.  
 Firm performance measures. Our primary measure of performance are return on assets 
(ROA). We also use other two accounting performance measures, return on equity (ROE) and 
profit margin (sales profit/ sales income), in robust tests. Although stock return and Tobin’s Q, 
market based performance measures, are widely used in literature on developed markets, they 
are not considered a proper performance measure for Chinese listed firms. Most Chinese listed 
firms originated from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with majority shares not tradable in the 
secondary market. The non-tradable shareholders, mainly governments or state-owned legal 
persons, typically acquire their shares of stocks at prices significantly lower than the initial 
public offering prices. Since there are big pricing gaps between tradable and non-tradable 
shares, Tobin's Q would not correctly reflect firm financial performances or firm values. In 
  
74 
addition, Chinese stock markets are highly speculative and share prices bear little relationship 
to their fundamental values (e.g. Bai, Liu, Lu, Song, and Zhang, 2004). 
 Measures of control variables. Following the recent corporate board literature (Conyon 
and He, 2011b; You and Du, 2012), we group the vector of control variables into three 
categories. The category of board feature variables contains the percentage of independent 
directors (Independent directors %), the number of board directors (board size), and a dummy 
variable (Duality) which equals 1 when the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board chair 
are the same person. The group of ownership structure variables includes shares held by largest 
shareholders (Largest shareholding), Ownership Concentration index, a State-owned enterprises  
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is controlled by a mother SOE or government 
agency.  To control for firm characteristics, we include the natural log of firm total assets 
(Log(firm size)), the logarithm of the number of employees (Log(employees)), and the book 
value of debt divided by total assets (Leverage). We also control CEO age (Age) and gender 
(Female) in the estimation of CEO dismissal. A set of year dummies is included to control for 
macro-economic shocks, and industry dummies based on the CSRC’s code.  
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											TABLE	3	
          Descriptive Statistics for Main Independent Variables 
  Definition Mean Median STDEV the 25th 
percentile 
the 75th 
percentile N 
ROA Net profit divided by total assets 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.021 0.065 14359 
Age CEO age 51.515 51.000 6.999 47.000 56.000 12490 
Female A dummy variable equals one if CEO is 
female 0.036 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 14359 
Board size Logarithm of number of directors 9.194 9.000 1.928 8.000 10.000 14246 
Duality An indicator equals one if the same 
person acts as CEO and chairman, and 
zero otherwise 0.139 0.000 0.346 0.000 0.000 13645 
Independent 
directors % 
Fraction of independent directors on 
board 0.365 0.333 0.053 0.333 0.375 14246 
Largest 
shareholding% 
Shares held by largest shareholders 
31.692 29.445 17.625 17.718 44.050 13577 
State-owned 
enterprises 
Dummy equals one if the firm is 
controlled by the state or government 
agencies, and zero otherwise 0.656 1.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 14359 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Herfindahl_index - Sum of squares of 
shareholding percentage of top five 
shareholders 0.175 0.141 0.128 0.073 0.252 14359 
Leverage Total liability over total assets 21.983 21.870 1.410 21.032 22.804 14359 
Log(firm size) Log value of firm’s total assets 7.614 7.690 1.527 6.774 8.559 14315 
Log(employees) Logarithm of number of employees in 
the firm 0.039 0.040 0.058 0.021 0.065 14359 
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2.3.3 Summary Statistics 
 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the main independent variables. About 65.6% 
of the listed companies in our sample are SOEs. The average ROA is about 3.9% which is 
consistent with prior research (Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006a). The 
average number of board members is 9.19 and independent directors make up 3.7% of them 
(the legal requirement has been one third since 2003). About 12% of firms have a CEO with 
dual leadership roles. The pairwise correlations between the variables are provided in 
Appendix B. There are only modest correlations among the independent variables. The values 
of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.02 to 1.86, and all the values are strictly 
less than 3, indicating that the regression analysis is free from multicollinearity problems 
(Greene, 2003). 
2.4 Research methodology 
To examine the impact of topic-focused meetings on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm 
performance, we estimate six series of panel data logistic regressions, for firm i in year t: !"#$%$&'&()	 	+&,-&,,%'./ = 1(!3"1#"-%453./67, 	9#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67,	  !3"1#"-%453./67	×	9#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67, @#4("#'	A%"&$%'3,./67)			 (1) 
 To test the effect of topic-focused meetings on the correlation between compensation and 
performance, we estimate six series of linear regression models using fixed effects: 	@#-:34,%(&#4./ = 1(!3"1#"-%453./67, 	9#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67,	  !3"1#"-%453./67	×	9#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67, @#4("#'	A%"&$%'3,./67)			(2) 
Fixed effects estimators can help to control the heteroscedasticity and endogeneity issues 
caused by unobserved firm-specific influences or measuring errors in regressions. In order to 
examine whether the holding of topic-focused meetings has an impact on performance-related 
CEO dismissal and compensation, we include interaction effects of the frequencies of meetings 
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on the six major topics individually. In other words, for each type of meeting, we take 	(#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67  and the interaction term !3"1#"-%453./67	×	(#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67 in the regression models. The method of interaction 
terms is commonly applied in economics and finance research (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; Kato and 
Long, 2006b; Weisbach, 1988; You and Du, 2012). A positive (negative) value for the effect 
of the interaction term would imply that the higher was the frequency with which topics were 
discussed at board meetings, the greater would be the sensitivity between performance and 
CEO compensation (turnover). 
 We can also partly mitigate the endogeneity issue by using lagged values of all independent 
variables to facilitate causality. See the section on robustness checks for further considerations 
of the endogeneity issues (IV and GMM method). 
 
2.5 Do Topic-Focused Board Meetings Affect Quality of Corporate Governance  
2.5.1 CEO Dismissal, Firm Performance, and Topic-Focused Board Meetings 
In this section, we examine whether the frequencies of topic-focused board meetings affect the 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The dependent variable is set to one if the CEO has 
been dismissed and zero otherwise. Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regressions with 
fixed effects based on equation (1)1, with firm performance measured using ROA.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 We also estimate equation (1) using fix effects and main results are consistent with the ones using random effects.  
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TABEL 4 
The Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics, on the sensitivity of CEO Dismissals to firm 
Performance. This table presents series of logistic regressions with fix effects. CEO dismissal is the 
dependent variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. Firm performance 
is measured by ROA. Nominations, compensation, management routines, firm control transactions, 
changes of equity structure and growth strategies are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused meeting 
frequency is the annual meeting frequency for each topic. The interaction terms between firm 
performance and topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderate effects on the 
relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in 
Table 4. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
CEO dismissal 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Nomination Compen-
sation 
Financial 
reports 
and audit   
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
ROA t-1 -3.280*** -2.281*** -2.284*** -2.036*** -2.561*** -2.668*** 
 (0.706) (0.614) (0.673) (0.753) (0.611) (0.620) 
Topic-focused meeting -0.181*** -0.103 0.111* 0.006 0.026 -0.167*** 
frequency t-1 (0.029) (0.088) (0.058) (0.021) (0.092) (0.062) 
ROAt-1 × topic-focused- 0.672* -1.764 -0.460 -0.304 0.466 0.767 
meeting t-1 (0.390) (1.389) (0.659) (0.298) (1.293) (0.977) 
Age t-1 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female -0.446** -0.447** -0.425** -0.433** -0.434** -0.421** 
 (0.208) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Board size t-1 -0.024 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028 -0.026 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Duality t-1 -0.330** -0.350** -0.362** -0.349** -0.353** -0.347** 
 (0.158) (0.156) (0.157) (0.156) (0.156) (0.157) 
Independent directors % t-1 1.196 1.153 1.098 1.094 1.086 1.121 
 (0.841) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) (0.835) 
Largest shareholding% t-1 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
State-owned enterprises t-1 0.152 0.152 0.165 0.165 0.160 0.146 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
Ownership Concentration t-1 -0.615 -0.717 -0.696 -0.685 -0.689 -0.811 
 (0.663) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.658) (0.661) 
Log(employees) t-1 -0.019 -0.013 -0.006 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Log(firm size) t-1 -0.174** -0.170** -0.178** -0.177** -0.179** -0.158** 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
Leverage t-1 0.346* 0.319 0.348* 0.336* 0.332* 0.284 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.203) 
Year & Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald  2 266.663 234.942 229.755 227.206 226.575 234.923 
Firm-years 8174 8174 8174 8174 8174 8174 
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 Table 4 shows that CEO dismissal and firm performance (ROA) are negatively associated 
after controlling for firm-level governance and characteristics. It indicates that CEO will be 
dismissed by boards if firm performance is poor. Our results are consistent with previous 
studies (e.g., Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009; Conyon and He, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b).  
 To test and evaluate the effects of topic-focused meetings on turnover-performance 
sensitivity, we introduce two variables, namely (#:&5	1#5;,3<		-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67 
and an interaction term !3"1#"-%453./67	×	(#:&5	1#5;,3<	-33(&4=	1"3>;345)	./67. For 
board meetings that discussed personnel changes involving directors, the CEO, and top 
management, the coefficients on the interaction term are significantly positive. This results 
suggest that the existence of board nomination meetings reduces the sensitivity of forced CEO 
dismissals to firm performance. Other board meeting topics are not likely to affect the 
dismissal-performance link.  
 In addition, the coefficients of Financial reports and audit meetings are positively 
significant, which implies that firms with more meetings discussing the financial report, auditor 
switches and changes of audit opinion are more likely to fire the CEO. The amendment of 
financial reports and changes of auditor opinion are probably related to poor firm performance 
and corporate governance problems. Financial reports and audit meetings help director to 
identify the weakness of firm performance, which could put more pressure on a firm to fire its 
CEO.  
 The number of CEO/chairman duality have negative effects on the probability of CEO 
dismissal,  consistent with the finding of  Goyal and Park (2002). Firms with more employees 
and larger size have a lower probability of forcibly dismissing their CEO. The coefficients of 
percentage of independent directors are negative, but not significant, which is consistent with 
the findings of Kato and Long (2006a) on Chinese market. 
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 Overall, our results imply that different types of board meetings may impact the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity variously. Interestingly, the existence of board nomination 
meetings lessens the sensitivity of CEO dismissals to firm performance.  
 
2.5.2 Compensation, Firm Performance, and Topic-Focused Board Meetings 
 Table 5 reports estimates from equation (2), in which we use panel data techniques with 
fixed effects to examine the effects of topic-focused boarding meetings on the relationship 
between executive compensation and firm performance in China. Compensation comprises 
salary, bonuses, and stipends. The sub-columns 1 to 6 represent each of the board meeting 
topics. 
 Table 5 shows that there is a positive relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance, suggesting that a CEO’s pay is generally higher in a good performance firm. Our 
results coincide with prior research (Conyon and He, 2012; Firth et al., 2006). It indicates that 
firm profitability is an important component in CEO’s compensation contracting in China. 
 As for the interaction terms, the coefficient of ROA interacted with the frequency of 
meetings on growth strategy are significantly positive. This indicates that the sensitivity 
between executive compensation and firm performance is higher when a firm has more 
meetings on growth strategy, which is consistent with our conjectures about the role of topic-
focused meetings. Meetings of growth strategies enable boards of directors to re-evaluate CEO 
capability and firm fundamentals deeply, and reward the CEO efforts on enhancing firm 
performance. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term of nomination meeting 
frequency and ROA is significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive 
compensation and a firm’s accounting performance is likely to be weakened by such meetings. 
Lastly, none of the interactions between other meeting topics and firm performance is 
statistically significant.  
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TABEL 5 
The Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm 
Performance. This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. Compensation is 
equal to the nature logarithm of the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. Firm 
performance is measured by ROA. Nominations, compensation, management routines, firm control 
transactions, changes of equity structure and growth strategies are the major topics discussed. Topic-
focused meeting frequency is the frequency of annual meetings on each topic. Interaction terms between 
firm performance and the topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects on 
the relationship between compensation and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided 
in Table 3. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2015. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Compensation 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Nomination Compen-
sation 
Financial 
reports 
and audit   
Corporate 
control 
transactions 
Change of 
equity 
structure 
Growth 
strategies 
ROA t-1 1.195*** 1.066*** 1.180*** 1.006*** 1.027*** 0.982*** 
 (0.093) (0.081) (0.138) (0.150) (0.081) (0.082) 
Topic-focused  0.014*** 0.053*** 0.021** 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 
meeting frequency t-1 (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.007) 
ROAt-1 × topic-focused- -0.142*** -0.229 -0.287 0.027 0.182 0.329*** 
meeting t-1 (0.050) (0.157) (0.236) (0.053) (0.164) (0.111) 
Board size t-1 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012* 0.012* 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Duality t-1 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) 
Independent directors % t-1 0.241** 0.246** 0.242 0.244 0.244** 0.244** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.155) (0.155) (0.105) (0.105) 
Largest shareholding% t-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
State-owned enterprises t-1 -0.100*** -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.099*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.038) (0.038) (0.019) (0.019) 
Ownership Concentration t-1 -0.080 -0.056 -0.073 -0.077 -0.076 -0.068 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.172) (0.172) (0.085) (0.085) 
Log(employees) t-1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log(firm size) t-1 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.194*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.010) 
Leverage t-1 -0.215*** -0.211*** -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.215*** -0.211*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.047) (0.047) (0.024) (0.024) 
Year & Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.514 0.515 0.514 0.513 0.513 0.514 
Firm-years 11874 11874 11874 11874 11874 11874 
 
 Additionally, we find that firms that hold more meetings discussing nomination and 
compensation may provide higher CEO compensation. This could be seen as evidence of the 
strong bargaining power of Chinese executives. Board size and the proportion of independent 
directors tend to have a positive effect on CEO compensation, as do the existence of a major 
shareholder and firm size which is consistent with Cao et al., (2011). However, state-owned 
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firms are no different to other firms when it comes to CEO pay level coincided with Conyon 
and He (2011). 
 Overall, the results signify that more meetings discussed firms’ mergers and acquisitions 
and the use of IPO proceeds would improve the relationship between compensation and firm 
performance. In contrast, board nomination meetings weaken this relationship. 
 
 
2.6 The Impact of Topic-Focused Board Meetings and Corporate Ownership in China 
 The Chinese listed firms have unique ownership structures. They often have controlling 
shareholders who can nominate/appoint their preferred agents to the boards and use their power 
to benefit themselves, sometimes at the expense of the minority shareholders. The real control 
power for the majority of the firms lies with either state owners or non-state owners. State-
owners and non-state owners are really different operation goals that may hugely impact 
management motivations and actions. Non-State controlling owners often have strong 
incentives to maximize firm values (for their own interests), and monitor executive activities. 
State owners such as SOEs or government agents have to consider political, social, and 
economic goals (Allen et al., 2005).  Because different controlling shareholders have various 
goals, we inspect whether corporate ownership affect the influence of board meetings on 
quality of corporate governance in this section. 
  We focus our examinations on two subsample: the SOEs subsample and the non-SOEs 
subsample. The SOEs subsample contains firms with State controlling shareholders, so State-
owners probably have significant influence on board activities.  Non-SOEs subsample consists 
of firms with non-state controlling shareholders, hence non-State-owners likely have dominant 
influence on board activities.  
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 Table 6 presents estimation results for the effects of nomination meetings in SOEs and non-
SOEs subsamples. The interaction terms ROA t-1  × Nomination meeting frequency t-1  are only 
significant in non-SOEs subsample. For CEO dismissal estimations, the sign of the interaction 
term in non-SOEs subsample is positive (Column (1) B), which is contradict with the negative 
sign of ROA effect. It suggests that board meetings on nomination deteriorate the sensitivity 
of CEO dismissal to performance in non-SOEs subsample. For CEO compensation estimation, 
the sign of the interaction term in non-SOEs subsample is negative (Column (2) B), which is 
contradict with the positive sign of ROA effect. It implies that nomination board meetings 
deteriorate the relationship between CEO compensation and performance subsample. In 
contrast, coefficients of interaction terms in SOEs subsample are not significant. Therefore, we 
find that nomination meetings fade quality of corporate governance in non-state controlled 
ownership, rather than a state-controlled ownership.  
 
TABEL 6 
The Effects of Nomination Meeting Frequency under Different Ownership Structure. This table reports 
results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. CEO dismissal is the dependent variable, which 
equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. Compensation is equal to the nature logarithm 
of the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. Firm performance is measured by 
ROA. Nomination meeting frequency is the number of annual meetings on nomination. Interaction 
terms between ROA and the nomination meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects 
on the relationship between CEO dismissal/compensation and firm performance. Other variable 
definitions are provided. 
 
 
 (1) CEO dismissal (2) CEO compensation  
 A. SOEs B. Non-SOEs A. SOEs B. Non-SOEs 
ROA t-1 -2.911*** -4.317*** 1.482*** 0.737*** 
 (0.901) (0.909) (0.119) (0.152) 
Nomination meeting  -0.175*** -0.062 0.005 0.020*** 
frequency t-1 (0.037) (0.042) (0.005) (0.006) 
ROA t-1  × Nomination  0.627 0.918* -0.038 -0.191** 
meeting frequency t-1 (0.503) (0.510) (0.064) (0.080) 
Control variables t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald 	χ2 217.832 139.434   
R2   0.497 0.531 
Firm-years 5844 4155 7728 4146 
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 Table 7 shows estimation results for the effects of growth strategy meetings in SOEs and 
non-SOEs subsamples. In both subsamples, the interaction terms ROA × Growth strategies 
meetings are significantly positive related to CEO compensation, and these signs have same 
direction with these of firm performance. It suggests that growth strategy meetings enhance 
sensitivities of CEO compensation to performance regardless the influence of ownership 
structures. Furthermore, the magnitude of coefficient of interaction term in non-State-
controlled firms (Column B) is greater than that in State-controlled firms (Column A). Overall, 
we find that meeting frequency on growth strategies enhance quality of corporate governance 
in improving CEO compensation-performance sensitivity.   
 
Table 7 
The Effects of Meeting Frequency on Growth Strategies under Different Ownership Structure. This 
table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. Compensation is equal to the nature 
logarithm of the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. Firm performance is 
measured by ROA. Meeting frequency of growth strategies is the number of annual meetings on growth 
strategies. Interaction term between ROA and the meeting frequency of growth strategies captures the 
meetings’ moderating effects on the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. 
Other variable definitions are provided. 
  
 CEO compensation 
 SOEs Non-SOEs 
ROA t-1 1.379*** 0.428*** 
 (0.107) (0.134) 
Growth strategies meetings t-1  -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.012) 
ROA t-1 × Growth 0.330** 0.452** 
strategies meetings t-1 (0.141) (0.178) 
Control variables t-1 Yes Yes 
R2 0.497 0.530 
Firm-years 7728 4146 
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2.7 Endogeneity Problems.  
 In addition, we adopt the IV and GMM (IV-GMM) method to control for potential 
endogeneity problems, particularly simultaneous causality concerns. We instrument the 
potentially endogenous variables of firm performance and topic-focused board meetings using 
a set of exogenous variables, selected according to economic rationales.  
   Following the literature, we instrument the firm performance using the second and third lags 
of performance and the first lagged GDP, which could be correlated with the lagged 
performance, but not directly related to CEO compensation (e.g. González et al., 2014; Shin 
and Seo, 2011). We also use average-independence and average-board-meetings to capture the 
industry-average level of board independence and board activity 2 . Firms’ governance 
arrangements are likely to be associated with those of their peers in the same industry, due to 
having the same business arrangements and market environment (Liu et al., 2015). Therefore, 
the industry average of board independence and board activity could affect the board 
effectiveness of any firm in that industry, and thereby the frequency of board meetings. 
Moreover, since the stickiness of board meetings may be an issue, we use the second and third 
lag of topic-focused meeting frequencies as instruments in their own individual estimations.  
 We perform a “difference-in-Sargan-statistic” test to examine whether endogeneity exists 
in firm performance and topic-focused meetings. The results show that the topic-focused 
meeting frequency can actually be treated as exogenous in the CEO dismissal model, as the F-
statistics were insignificant in all cases. However, topic-focused meetings should be treated as 
endogenous in the compensation model, and firm performance as endogenous in both models. 
                                                
2 Average-independence is measured as the mean value of the percentage of independent directors in other firms 
in the same industry and year. Average-board-meetings is the mean value of board meeting frequency in other 
firms in the same industry and year. 
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Next, we check whether the suitability of our instruments is confirmed by the identification 
tests. Based on the Sargan-Hansen test, we cannot reject the null that our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms, that is, unrelated to CEO dismissal and compensation. The 
results of the Kleibergen-Paap rk and Stock and Yogo statistics for the weak identification 
problem are significant in all cases, rejecting the null that our instruments are weakly related 
to firm performance or topic-focused board meetings. Overall, our instruments are valid for 
reducing the simultaneous causality concerns. The IV-GMM estimates are in line with our 
earlier findings.  
 
2.8 Robustness Tests 
2.8.1 Alternative measures of CEO dismissal and compensation.  
 As mentioned when we defined the variable of CEO dismissal, using public information to 
classify forced or unforced CEO dismissals may be problematic. Following previous research 
(e.g., Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b), we employ a binary variable that 
equals one to measure any type of CEO personnel change, regardless of the reason for dismissal. 
We re-estimate the logit equation (1) using this new definition of CEO dismissal (forced and 
unforced) as the dependent variable. Our results are qualitatively similar to those obtained 
using forced CEO dismissal. 
 We also use the individual-level CEO payment data available from the year 2005 as a 
robustness check. After 2005, individual compensation data are available; approximately 40% 
of CEOs did not receive any compensation from the listed firms in our sample. These CEOs 
are likely to have received their salaries from the mother company, or to have held a large 
proportion of shares. The sample including 3,454 listed-firm-year observations over the period 
of 2005-2010. The results based on the individual data are similar to those based on aggregate 
compensation (Appendix C). The coefficient on the interaction term (nomination meeting 
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frequency × ROA) is significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive 
compensation and a firm’s accounting performance is likely to be weakened by such meetings. 
Unreported results for ROE and the profit margin are similar to those for ROA. 
 Furthermore, considering the influence of the compensation paid to peers in the same 
industry, we use relative aggregate executive compensation as the payment measure. We 
calculate the relative aggregate executive compensation by subtracting the industrial median 
of the average compensation of the three highest executives in firms within the same industry 
and year. Our results are similar after performing this robustness check. 
2.8.2 Relative Performance Measures.  
 For the sensitivity analysis, we also adopt industry-adjusted performance measures, since 
the evaluation of a CEO’s performance may be based on his/her industry peers (e.g. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). The firm’s relative performance is measured as the firm’s 
performance minus the median performance of firms in the same industry and year. The 
unreported outcomes remain qualitatively similar. We also use a different time period (2005-
2010 instead of 2003-2010), reflecting the change in disclosure quality after 2005. Again, our 
main results stay qualitatively unaltered. 
2.8.3 Eleven meeting topics recorded in the CSMAR 
 In order to test whether our results are affected by grouping strategies on meeting topics, we 
re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using meeting frequencies of eleven topics recorded in the 
CSMAR (see Column 2 of Table 1). Except for meetings on nomination, the interactions of 
other types of meetings are not significant for CEO dismissal and performance sensitivity. 
Regarding the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, the interactions of meetings 
on merger and acquisitions (6) and use of IPO proceeds (9) and firm performance are positively 
significant, while other interactions are not significant. Meetings and merger and acquisitions 
(6) and the use of IPO proceeds (9) were combined into meetings on growth strategies in the 
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main analysis. Therefore, unreported results for eleven meeting topics show consistent results 
with our main analysis based on the six major topics. 
2.8.4 China-specific control variables.  
 As our study is based on Chinese listed firms, we further add more control variables to 
considers the special institutional and economic environment. After the US board system has 
been introduced to China in year 2001, the supervisory board of directors still exists. Thus, we 
add the size of supervisory board to control for the potential effect of the monitoring from 
supervisors. Regarding the regional imbalances in economic growth, we add the Chinese 
government transparency index (or regional dummies) accordingly. Our key results remain 
unaltered after considering characteristics of the Chinese market. 
   
2.9 Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a better understanding of how board activity affects 
board effectiveness in linking CEO compensation/dismissal to firm performance. In our 
empirical examination, to measure board activity, we decided to move beyond the frequency 
and target the contents of board meetings. Board meetings, the main venue for directors to 
fulfill their monitoring obligations, are normally topic-focused. As shown in our data, the topics 
of meetings include the management and directors’ nominations and compensation, 
management routines, firm control transactions, changes in equity structure, and growth 
strategies. Although the role of board meetings has been widely discussed by academics and 
practitioners, previous studies tend to portray them as standardized at the firm level. 
 To fill this gap in the literature, we exploit a unique dataset on board meeting agendas of 
Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010. First, we examine whether the sensitivity of 
CEO dismissal (compensation) to performance is significantly negative (positive), which 
generally reflects the effectiveness of the board monitoring and even the efficiency of corporate 
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governance. Secondly, we examine the influences of topic-focused meetings on these two 
sensitivities. The rationale behind this is that discussing certain topics could enhance the 
informativeness of the board, thus helping directors to strengthen those sensitivities, thereby 
improving the corporate governance mechanism. 
 Our results reveal that CEO dismissal is significantly negatively and compensation 
positively correlated to all of the accounting-based performance measures. However, the 
market-based performance measures play a limited role in explaining the probability of CEO 
dismissal or the size of compensation. Our results suggest that a firm’s profitability is still the 
main criterion used to evaluate the CEO’s performance. We also find that the frequencies of 
meetings on major topics are diverse, as are the roles of such meetings in monitoring the top 
management. In particular, the sensitivity between CEO compensation and performance is 
stronger when there are more board meetings on growth strategies, such as mergers and 
acquisitions and applying IPO proceeds. When directors discuss firm growth strategies, they 
could obtain comprehensive information about history and current firm performance and future 
strategies. Our results suggest the soft information captured in board meetings is likely to 
influence directors’ evaluations of the CEO’s capability, and they will change the CEO 
compensation scheme accordingly, to motivate the CEO and other managers. Meanwhile, most 
of the major topics of board meetings are not likely to affect the sensitivity between CEO 
turnover and performance. In fact, meetings on nominations could even reduce both turnover-
performance and pay-performance sensitivity.  
 In China, the majority of listed firms have dominant State shareholders or non-State 
shareholders. These two types of shareholders have different goals, which may influence 
managerial incentives, and selections or activates of board members. We use subsample 
analyses, and find that board meetings on growth strategies could enhance CEO compensation-
performance sensitivity in both types of firms. However, meetings on nominations reduce both 
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turnover-performance and pay-performance sensitivity in firms controlled by dominant non-
State shareholders. 
 The findings of our study suggest that differences in the effects of different meeting topics 
on the CEO pay/dismissal-to-performance sensitivities and highlight the need for more tailored 
approaches towards board requirements. In the countries that carry out good ‘corporate 
governance guidance’ policies, regulators’ agendas have stayed focused on board composition 
and structure, and the total number of annual meetings, as the means to allow boards to best 
perform their duties. A sound board structure following such guidance alone cannot ‘make 
great boards great’ (Sonnenfeld, 2002). To a certain degree, our study reflects the complexities 
involved in the board decision-making process. Thus, it calls for a reconsideration of the 
current one-size-fits-all approach taken by the regulators. Particularly in China, the regulators 
should consider introducing regulations to prevent potentially self-interested behaviour from CEO 
and non-State controlling shareholders via making nominations and personnel changes to the 
directors and top management. 
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Appendix A 
An Examples of Independent Director’ Reports. Compensation (2) and Loan Guarantees (5) were 
discussed on 27 April 2007 in board meeting of Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd 
(WHZS, 000785). 
Stock trading code: 000785 (SHE) 
Company name: Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd (WHZS) 
Announcement date: 27 April 2007 
Independent directors: Tan, Liwen; Li, Yanping; Xie, Huobao 
Topic code: 2-Compensation; 5- Loan Guarantees  
Opinion type: unqualified opinion 
Content:  
Pursuant to the “Guiding Opinions on Establishing Independent Directors in Listed Companies”, 
“Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules”, “Articles of Association”, and other related regulations, we 
would like to issue the following opinion on WHZS’s following two following issues passed at the 
fourth meeting of the sixth session of the board of directors: 
 
First, to our best knowledge, we agree that compensations of directors and senior management in 2006 
have meet the plan requirements-" the implementation plan of company directors and senior 
management compensation in 2006" approved by the annual General Meeting (2005). 
 
Second, based on the annual report 2006 of WHZS, the audit report 2006 (2007-421), and the “Special 
statement of controlling shareholders and other related parties possessing fund of the listed firm”(2007-
148) provided by Wuhan Zhonghuan Accounting Firms, we have carefully examined the incurred and 
accumulative amount of loan guarantees, we believe the loan guarantees for subsidiary companies in 
2006 was 160 million RMB, accumulated to 260 million. No other loan guarantees for related parties 
happened in 2006.  
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Appendix B 
 Correlation of Main Variables. CEO dismissal is a dichotomous variable, which equals one if the CEO is dismissed, and zero otherwise. Compensation is equal 
to the nature logarithm of the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. Other variables are lagged values. Meetings definitions are provided 
in Table 1, and other independent variable definitions are shown in Table 2. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 CEO dismissal 1                    
2 Compensation -0.07** 1                   
3 Nomination 0.23** 0.10** 1                  
4 Compensation 0 0.22** 0.21** 1                 
5 Financial reports and audit 0.03** 0.05** 0.27** 0.22** 1                
6 Corporate control transactions 0.04** 0.15** 0.21** 0.14** 0.23** 1               
7 Change of equity structure 0.01 -0.15** -0.08** -0.06** -0.04** -0.06** 1              
8 Growth strategies -0.01 0.14** 0.16** 0.20** 0.19** 0.21** -0.06** 1             
9 ROA -0.08** 0.25** -0.06** 0.05** -0.10** -0.01 0 -0.01 1            
10 Age -0.13** 0.24** -0.02+ 0.07** 0 0.02* -0.05** 0.05** 0.10** 1           
11 Female 0 0.01 0 0 -0.02** -0.02* 0.01 0 0.01 -0.03** 1          
12 Board size -0.04** 0.11** 0 -0.01 -0.09** 0.02* 0.03** -0.02+ 0.05** 0.06** -0.01+ 1         
13 Duality 0.01 -0.02+ 0.01 0.05** 0.08** -0.03** 0 0.03** -0.03** -0.01 -0.01+ -0.12** 1        
14 Independent directors % 0.02** 0.07** 0.03** 0.06** 0.06** 0.03** -0.06** 0.07** -0.02** 0.02** -0.02* -0.32** 0.05** 1       
15 Largest shareholding% 0.02* 0.08** 0 -0.01 -0.07** 0.02+ -0.03** 0.01 0.10** 0.09** -0.01 0.06** -0.12** 0.06** 1      
16 State-owned enterprises 0.05** 0 -0.04** -0.13** -0.11** 0.02** 0.01 -0.08** -0.02* 0.06** -0.03** 0.20** -0.17** -0.05** 0.39** 1     
17 Ownership Concentration 0.02+ 0.07** 0 -0.02** -0.08** 0.04** -0.02* -0.02* 0.13** 0.07** -0.01 0.08** -0.12** 0.03** 0.76** 0.24** 1    
18 Log(employees) -0.05** 0.31** 0 0.08** -0.05** 0.13** -0.05** 0.09** 0.13** 0.20** -0.04** 0.26** -0.07** 0.02** 0.22** 0.24** 0.25** 1   
19 Log(firm size) -0.04** 0.54** 0.05** 0.13** -0.02** 0.20** -0.11** 0.12** 0.17** 0.24** -0.02** 0.25** -0.10** 0.10** 0.34** 0.23** 0.35** 0.68** 1  
20 Leverage 0.05** -0.09** 0 -0.04** 0.02* 0.08** 0.01 -0.07** -0.18** -0.09** 0 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.05** -0.02* -0.04** -0.01 0.04** 1 
 
Chapter 4: The Hidden Information Content:  
Evidence from the Tone of Independent Director Reports 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The paper examines whether the information content of independent director reports (IDRs) 
has predication power on corporate performance. We generate the tone of IDRs by using 
Chinese word segmentation and Naïve Bayesian machine leaning algorithm. We find that the 
average tone of the IDRs is positively related with future firm performance after controlling 
other factors that influence firm performance. Our results also show that directors with more 
careers concerns are more likely to be critical and using negative tone when they express 
opinions. Furthermore the negative tone of IDRs is negatively associated with firm 
performance for firms with greater monitoring necessities. 
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4.1 Introduction 
A practical difficulty for corporate governance is the existence of asymmetric information. In 
corporations, asymmetric information generally refers to circumstances that the agent (e.g. 
managers) who agrees to carry out some duties, have more information than the principal (e.g. 
shareholders). Thus the principal has difficulties to assess whether corporate outcome is owing 
to the agent’ efforts/fails or owing to situations that are unmanageable by the agent. The agent 
may decide to run the corporation in her/his interests instead of the principle’s ones (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  
Boards of directors are believed to be an essential internal governance mechanism, although 
various agency problems and corporate governance systems exist around the world19. Boards 
have liability and ultimate legal authority regards decision marking in corporations. Boards 
must evaluate and authorise corporate financial and operation decisions, and other plans and 
strategies (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). As a results, board of 
directors at least have more information than minority shareholders and other stakeholders that 
cannot access to firm information except from public disclosures (such as annual reports). 
The communication by boards of directors offer researchers a great setting in which to 
recognise private information sets, namely seeing corporate operations from director’ eyes. 
The examination of directors’ communication could be helpful for stakeholders which cannot 
                                                
19 Due to the different ownership structure around the world, there are two typical types of agency problems: one 
is the classic agency problem due to professional managers who have limited shareholdings run the corporations 
on the behavour of the shareholding as in the US and the UK; the other one is the potential expropriation of the 
minority shareholders (e.g. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). This is because that in other countries, 
corporations usually have controlling and minority shareholders, however only controlling shareholders have 
enough power to influence firms’ decision making process.  
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engage in firm decision-making to understand firm behaviour. For instant, the theory of 
administrative behaviour states that employee communication patterns during critical decision-
making could expose the structural organization design (Simon, 1999). It  has been found that 
manager’s disclosures have significant associates with firm profitability and earning quality 
(e.g. Li, 2008, 2010a). 
 However, whether director disclosures are truly informative remains an open empirical 
question. First, directors of boards may also may lack of information. Especially non-executive 
directors primarily rely on the chief executive and management for information. Management 
is probably reluctant share information with boards if they have been monitored intensively 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Second, directors are criticized to be passive in monitoring firm 
decisions. They barely challenge management’ proposals to keep ‘friendly’ relationship with 
management, since the management has power in replacement and appointment of board 
member (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Warther, 1998). Therefore, the informativeness of 
directors’ disclosures are determined by their capability and willing to require enough 
information.  
 Boards of directors normally do not have an independent channel to release their opinions 
on corporate decisions. China provides us a unique setting to study the information content of 
board’s disclosures. Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched a novel 
practice that independent directors in listed firms are mandated to publicly issue their opinions 
after board meetings, to protect the minority shareholders. Independent director’s reports 
contains firm identifier, topics and proposals discussed in the board meetings (narratives), and 
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director opinions. From 2004 to 2012, about 24300 reports20 have been issued about board 
meetings in Chinese non-financial companies listed on main boards of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Jiang, Wan and  Zhao (2016) and Tang, Du, and Hou (2013) start to explore 
the ‘disagree opinions’ in this dataset, they find that shareholders, creditors and regulators 
actively react to director’s dissension, subsequently improve corporate governance and market 
transparency. However, over 98% of these reports are ‘agreement’ opinions. 
Director’s tone in a report is the attitude towards firm historical and current operations and 
the fitness of proposals discussed to a firm. We employ a Naïve Bayesian learning algorithm 
with Chinese word segmentation to evaluate the tone of about 23900 independent director 
reports with “agreement” opinions over the period of 2004 to 2012. First, we examine whether 
information content in normal independent director reports has power to predict future firm 
performance. Using panel data analysis with fix effects, we investigate whether the average 
tone of independent director reports in a firm is (positively) associated with firm future 
performance. We find that the tone of independent director’ report is positively related to one 
period future performance. Further, the positive (negative) tone is positive (negative) related 
to firm future performance. Our results suggests that the report’ tone has explanatory power 
incremental to other factors in forecasting future performance. It is also an empirical evidence 
to support that board of directors do understand the problems/opportunities in business 
operations and ‘attempt’ to reveal information to outside stakeholders. 
                                                
20 There are 11 topics (categories) discuss in board meetings by CSRC requirements (2001): personnel and 
compensation of directors and top management, financial reports and audit, and operating decisions including the 
authorization of related party transactions and guaranteed loans, merger and acquisitions, changes in ownership, 
financing, disposal of assets, and other miscellaneous events. 
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Further, we study the determinants of explaining the variations in the tone of independent 
director’s report. Since the information content of directors’ disclosures rely on directors’ 
motivation and expertise, directors’ monetary and reputation incentives, their working 
experiences, and other board features are included in the model. Liebman and Milhaupt (2008) 
point out that directors who lean to achieve high aspirations and self-accomplishments have to 
build reputation for more career and business opportunities beyond board seats in a countries 
with weak institutional environment. We find that directors who has more career concerns 
(such as younger directors and directors with accounting background) are more likely to issue 
negative report. Our results also show that firms with more board committees, greater board 
meetings, less leverage, and controlled by private shareholders tend to have more positive 
independent director reports. 
Finally, we find empirical evidence to support our hypothesis that independent director play 
more monitoring role in firms with greater monitoring necessities. We use subsample analyses 
and find that the negative tone of IDRs is negative corrected to firm future performance. In 
firms with higher liquidity or bankruptcy risk or with bad performance, the relationship is 
negative and significant. By contrast, the coefficients of negative tone are negative but 
insignificant (smaller magnitude) in lower higher liquidity or bankruptcy risk firms. 
 Our results are robust after controlling board and firm characteristics and in sub-periods, 
Although claim causality relationship between the tone of reports and firm profitability, IV-
GMM estimator is still applied in our study as robust check to mitigate other endogenous issues. 
The main results do not alter. 
Our study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, this study provides new evidence 
on corporate disclosures by using a large sample dataset of director’s views on firm profitability. 
Previous research largely focuses on the manager’s views (e.g. Li, 2008, 2010, 2011).  The 
paper also extends the literature on the effectiveness of boards of directors. We explore 
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directors’ roles in corporate governance via director disclosures rather drawing interferences 
from board structure such as board composition (Weisbach, 1988), diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009) and size (Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998). 
We also provide more evidence to support the regulations of launching independent director 
system. Independent director system can benefit to protect the outside stakeholders by 
providing more monitoring on firm operations. It complements the literature on dissension 
opinions in this practice (Jiang et al., 2016; Ma, 2013; Tang et al., 2013), to support regulations 
that requires the disclosure of independent directors reports on firm’s proposals and business 
procedures.  
The rest of this paper is organizes as follows. Section 2 discuss the institutional background 
of independent director system in China, the implications of textual analysis using Naïve 
Bayesian learning algorithm, and hypotheses development. Section 3 present the details of 
method to create the tone of independent director’s report and model design, and sample 
statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 presents the robustness check. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2 Corporate Governance in China: the role of independent director and their reports  
Although Chinese stock market is the second largest one, over $10.3 trillion by 2015, according 
to the World Federation of Exchanges, the quality of corporate governance is unmatched with 
market capitalization status. The market, established around 1990, was aimed to provide state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) capital and liquidity to develop and reform. Consequently, listed 
firms derived from SOEs (over 60 %) are still controlled or strongly interfered by government, 
government agent or an SOE. Additionally, the legal structure in “private” listed firms is 
complicated with concentrated ownership and group affiliations (Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005).  
Both issues cause interest conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders and low 
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transparency in corporate operations. A supervisory board in listed firms is obligatory like the 
one in German’s two board system, however issues of corporate governance are still severe 
due to the lack of independence and accountability of supervisory board members.  
 The independent director system is set up in 200121 using the experience of the US and UK 
corporate governance law and practice. It contains regulations about the selection/dismissal, 
composition and responsibilities of independent directors to ensure their independence from 
controlling shareholders, management and corporate business relations22. The responsibility to 
protect the interests of all the stakeholders are expected to rely on the independent directors. 
The role of main board director is comparable with that of the US. Boards of directors have a 
legitimate obligation to oversee firm’s strategic decisions and polices, and to select, review, 
compensate, and when in need of, terminate top management. The function of boards is mainly 
through discussing and voting proposals at board meetings. A proposal has to obtain support 
by the majority of board to be effective. Numbers of empirical studies (e.g. Conyon and He, 
2012; Kato and Long, 2006; Liu, Miletkov, Wei, and Yang, 2015) show that board 
independence have significant positive effects on corporate governance, in terms of improving 
firm performance and efficiency of compensating/dismissal CEO to performance and reducing 
insider tunneling. 
                                                
21 The system establishment is based on “Guideline for the establishment of the independent director system in 
listed firms” by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in August 2001, then legal status is 
established in new “Corporate Law of China” 2005. 
22 For example, independent directors can be nominated by board and supervisory board members or shareholders 
who has at least one percentage share; appointment decisions are made by shareholders' meeting. They constitute 
at least one third of board, only serve maximally two terms (6 years). They are not employees in the listed firms, 
or have kinships with corporate employees. They do not have over 1 % share of listed firm, or they do not have 
kinships with nature people in 10 largest shareholders. They are not employees or kin to employees in firms which 
have over 5 % share of the listed company or in firms which are 5 largest shareholders. 
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Independent directors are required to publish reports about board meeting contents. A few 
studies using this dataset of reports to only focus on investigate negative opinions. Tang, Du, 
and Hou (2013) find that the stock market has a negative reaction to the disclosure of 
independent reports with negative opinions. The probability of receiving a negative report is 
higher in firms with more agency problems. Jiang, Wan, and Zhao (2016) show that 
independent directors who have higher human capital concerns are more likely to report 
negative opinions, whereas who have issued negative opinions will be reward with more 
directorships and lower possibility of regulatory sanctions. Consequently, stakeholders take 
actions to improve corporate governance following independent directors’ dissension: cutting 
in inter-corporate borrowing, reducing bank loan, and dismissal CEO/Chairman (Jiang et al., 
2016; Tang et al., 2013). Overall, these results suggest that independent directors’ dissension 
are useful to protect the interests of outside stakeholders. 
 However, the amount of negative opinions is only 328 account for 1.15% in all 28634 reports 
from 2004 to 201223. Each report comprises four parts, firm name, narratives to describe the 
proposal discussed at board meeting, identification of directors and meeting date. Ji, Taravela, 
and Yin (2016) use the full dataset to obtain the meeting frequency on different topics and find 
that the number of nomination and growth strategies meetings could alter the relationship 
between CEO turnover/compensation and firm performance. The results indicate that 
agreement reports includes information beyond the “negative opinions”. Therefore, this study 
examines that whether the narratives in independent director report contain information content. 
 
                                                
23 The low dissension rate is not unique in China, which is around 2% in Israel firms (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 
2013). In fact, director dissensions are hardly observed, the cases in China are precious to researchers who 
interested in board function.  
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4.3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1 Disclosures of Management views and firm performance.  
Literature in financial accounting that examine the textual disclosures or firm disclosures 
mainly focus on manager’s views. They consider that managers make decisions depending on 
future firm performance, which based on more precise and complete information about their 
firms. Li (2010b) argues that the earnings quality intimated from managerial disclosures can 
be ‘incremental or even superior to existing empirical measures’, since great information 
symmetry occurs between managers and outsiders. Empirical studies shows that the Linguistic 
patterns and textual analysis measures from management’s views have prediction power on 
firm profitability, including CEO letter to Shareholder online (Segars and Kohut, 2001) and 
CEO forward-looking statements in annual reports  (Li, 2010a), and management’ views on 
firms’ competitive environment (Li, Lundholm, and Michael, 2013).  Therefore, it have been 
documented that manager’s disclosures have significant connections with firm profitability and 
earning quality (e.g. Li, 2008, 2010a). 
Overall, it is lack of evidence of the informativeness of director’s disclosures. This may be 
because directors in developed markets only can express their opinion about firm performance 
and governance via annual reports. This type of disclosures is stylized and modified, so it may 
not show directors’ communication patterns. 
4.3.2 Tone of independent director reports and firm performance.  
Independent director reports (IDRs) are an innovative source of corporate disclosures, 
which are issued by independent directors after board meetings. Independent directors could 
access private information which cannot been explained by financial data. However, they are 
often criticized for passive monitoring due to lack of independence and motivations to work 
diligently to mitigate agency costs (Tirole, 2010). However, directors have demand to 
protect/enhance their reputation by signaling their commitment to practice good corporate 
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governance so as to obtain more seats in listed firms. It has been suggested by theoretical and 
empirical results that reputation could be a strong incentive for independent directors to oversee 
firm operations (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Levit and Malenko, 2016). 
Moreover, independent directors necessarily use independent reports to avoid legitimacy risk 
due to firms’ or executives’ illegal behaviours that damage shareholders’ interests.  
We expect that narratives in the reports include information about firm operations, and 
explore whether these reports cover information about future firm performance. Independent 
directors have negative (positive) information about firm operations or future strategies, the 
tone of IDRs should be negative (positive). We hypothesis that the tone of reports is positive 
associated to firm performance. The empirical examinations are a joint test of (a) whether 
independent directors provide information about the future in the reports, (b) whether they have 
different attitudes about future regardless majority of their opinions are “agreement” and (c) 
whether sentiment analysis method (combining Chinese word segmentation and machine 
leaning algorithm) capture the information in reports.  
If the sentiment analysis method is able to measure the tone of independent directors, then 
evidence that the tone of IRDs predicts future performance is coherent with hypotheses that 
independent directors shows attitudes in their reports and IDRs have information contents. 
However, if the IDRs’ tone based on our measure is not related to future performance, we 
cannot reject hypothesis (a) and (b) because the result can be because of the low power method 
applied.  
4.3.3 Determinants of IDR’s Tone  
The content of reports relies not only naturedly on independent directors’ characteristics, 
but also influenced by corporate governance and performance which is the foundation of 
directors’ analysis.  
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Independent	directors’	motivations,	experience	and	other	characteristics.		
Director’s age and directorships are employed to proxy for director’s reputation incentive 
for monitoring. Age could be a factor influencing directors’ reputation concerns and directors 
behaviors (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). For example, young directors longer career plan, so 
they have more motivations to build reputation. Jiang et al. (2016) document that younger 
director are more likely to issue negative reports to reveal governance problems in serving 
firms. Directorships is the number of seats in for the director in listed companies, which has 
been widely used in empirical literature to capture the human capital in developed countries 
(Yermack, 2004). Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that equity based compensation for 
independent directors are more effective in corporate governance, but it has not been broadly 
adopted in Chinese listed firms. We use all director’s cash payments to measure monetary 
incentive. 
 Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that female directors are more likely to allocate more 
effects to monitor, in terms of better meeting attendance and joining more committees. Female 
on board could “push” male directors work harder as well. Hence gender diversity has a 
positive influence on board efficiency and firm outcomes. Gender diversity measured by the 
percentage of women in independent directors is employed. Other characteristics such as 
education level and working experiences are controlled as well. Corporate	Governance	Indicators	and	Firm	Features. 
 Empirical studies have explored a number of board characteristics which influence board 
monitoring and advising activities, then eventually affect corporate governance and firm 
outcomes. Liu et al. (2015) find comprehensive and robust evidence to support board 
independence has a positive effect on firm performance in China. Particularly, they document 
that independent directors have a positive impact on reducing insider self-dealing. The choice 
of optimal board size reflects tradeoff between costs of monitoring and benefits, and considers 
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the work efficiency as a group. Several studies examine the relationship between board size 
and firm performance and support that larger board size has a negative effect on firm value 
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996). Remuneration, audit and nomination 
committee could meet more often than entire board, and function more efficiently because of 
higher independence, smaller size, and with associated expertise in the committee. Empirical 
studies basically support that various committees provide means to intense monitoring  and 
have positive effects on lessening related corporate governance issues (Conyon and Peck, 1998; 
Klein, 2002; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Although CSRC encourages listed firms to set 
up committees to accomplish corporate governance system, it does not mandate the number 
and type of committees should be established. Hence the number of committees is firm own 
decisions, and firms with more committees should have higher corporate governance quality. 
Board meeting frequency captures monitoring activities (Vafeas, 1999).  
Firm size captures many properties of a company’s business environment. Larger firms 
provide directors greater visibility, status (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), reimbursement (Ryan 
and Wiggins, 2004), and the possibility of gaining extra directorships (Yermack, 2004). One 
major role of independent director in China is to prevent tunnelling behaviour (related party 
transactions) and earnings manipulation in listed firms. Account receivables, as the main 
accrual anomaly, has been used as an instrument to manipulate earnings in China (Peng, Wei, 
and Yang, 2011). Abnormal account receivables could be negative related to the tone of reports. 
Ownership structure affects firm fundamental, such as firm performance, corporate disclosure 
transparency and CEO turnover in China (e.g. Kato and Long, 2006b). We use state-owned 
enterprise indicator, share owned by largest shareholder and the ratio of share owned by largest 
shareholder to the second largest to ownership effects.  We also include standard firm 
performance measure – ROA and Tobin’s Q and capital structure measure – leverage ratio. 
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4.4 Sentiment Analysis in Finance 
4.4.1 Sources of Financial Narratives 
The textual information in finance comes mainly from three sources: mandatory 
filings/public corporate disclosures (e.g., 10-Ks, 8-Ks annual reports, IPO prospectuses, etc.), 
media articles (e.g., Financial Times, newswire services, etc.) and internet messages (Kearney 
and Liu, 2014). Mandatory filings and public corporate disclosures are primary sources for 
researchers to know how insiders provide incremental information for firms. Previous studies 
explored disclosure characteristics through manual coding, which is hard to create a large-
sample measure of disclosure quality. Li (2008, 2010) examines the readability to describe 
disclosure transparency and tone of corporate filings on the MD&A sections of 10-Ks and 10-
Qs using quantitative textual analysis. The media articles contain the positive or negative tone, 
which affects to the economic case, the stock market and firms’ performance.  Tetlock, Saar-
Tsechansky, and MacSkassy (2008) extract negative words from Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 
regarding S&P 500 companies that predict individual firms' accounting earnings and stock 
returns. García (2013) find that negative news has more impact on Dow Jones index during 
recessions. Ahmad, Han, Hutson, Kearney, and Liu (2016) show that media-expressed negative 
tone has no effect on firms' returns. Social media are a significant amount source of many 
people express their opinions about certain finance topics. Bollen, Mao, and Zeng (2011) create 
measurements of sentiment from millions of Twitter feeds are associated with the change of 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) over time. Each of narratives has its features; 
corporate disclosures deliver sentiment from top management, the information is specific and 
focusing on firms' level, while a source from social media has larger scale data but tends to be 
unreliable.     
4.4.2 The approaches of Sentiment Analysis 
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Sentiment analysis is the computational research regarding tone or opinions of textual 
information using natural language processing. Sentiment analysis has been widely employed 
in detecting customers' reviews and analysing users' behaviours in social media. There are two 
standard methods for the sentiment analysis: dictionary-based approach and machine learning.  
a) Dictionary-based Sentiment Analysis. 
 The dictionary-based approach uses a predefined dictionary of positive and negative words 
to match the words, phrases or sentences into groups (Also called ‘bag-of-words’ model). The 
most famous word lists are the General Inquirer (GI) built-in dictionary (Smith, Ogilvia, Stone, 
Dunphy, and Hartman, 1967). Other sources we can find such as the Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (LIWC). There are also some dictionaries available to Chinese words, such as 
NTUSD Chinese sentiment dictionary.  
To construct the sentiment measure through a dictionary method, we first need to tokenize 
the words or phrase in a corpus. After removing unnecessary stop words, such as a, the, and, 
before, will, etc. We classify the sentiment words from the dictionary (GI) and compute 
frequencies for sentiment words occurrence in the text. This simple case just takes account into 
equally weighted term sentiment. Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) use proportional weighting 
for each term inversely proportional to its document frequency, and employ GI negative words 
and the finance-specific word lists (L&M lists) to assess sentiment in 10-Ks and can briefly 
predict returns. The use of the finance-specific list can avoid unexpected effect and inaccurate 
result due to the same word has a different tone in various industries or topics.  However, there 
is no available dictionary for the Chinese corporate disclosures. Thus, the dictionary-based 
approach may have less reliable and lower expectations. 
b) Machine Learning 
The machine learning method is to apply algorithms as a classification problem. We use a 
part of the complete corpus of textual data to train a classifier by the linguistic features, then 
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using the classifier to score the remaining corpus. The words in the training set are tokenized 
as “positive”, “negative”, or some other sentiment, for instance, “calm”, “tense”, “excited” and 
“upset” depends on circumstance. Pang, Lee, and Vaithyanathan (2002) employ three machine 
learning approaches -Naïve Bayes, support vector machines and maximum entropy, and found 
that the machine learning driven techniques have better performance than manual coding. The 
statistical inference picks up sentiment classification rules from trained set and applies to the 
whole textual data. For example, Li (2010) uses the Naïve Bayesian algorithm to classify the 
given sentence into a category from four predefined categories (positive, negative, neutral, and 
uncertain). The sentiment is positive if the probability of the sentence in the positive category 
is higher than in the negative, neutral and uncertain categories. 
 
 
4.5 Methodology 
4.5.1 Measure the tone of reports 
In this paper, we employ the machine learning method driven by Naïve Bayes classifier. 
The main reason is lacking financial dictionary for Chinese word. The NTUSD only cannot 
provide a finance category of word sentiment. Therefore, the dictionary-based method could 
be not suitable to the financial report. For example, consider a sentence from the Chinese 
independent director report and translate into English “The asset has had good profitability and 
huge market potential, the attrition only occurs short-term, we still expect the company will 
follow the future development to provide a greater return for investors.” From NTUSD, the 
sentence has a lot of positive words (such as “profitability” and “greater”).  But we can see that 
the tone should be negative. The dictionary-based approach just matches the sentiment words 
and does not consider the context of the sentences. The machine learning approach has the 
advantage of processing the particular textual data by constructing customised classifiers, 
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which can be trained efficiently under supervised learning. To calculate the measure of tone, 
we have two major steps. First, the words should be segmented, because the different 
combination of words may have the different tone for Chinese word. Then we employ Naïve 
Bayes classifier to train the corpus. 
4.5.2 Chinese Word Segmentation 
Unlike English corpus, segmentation is the most important procedure for Chinese word. 
There are several tools for the segmentation, e.g. Stanford Word Segmenter can split Chinese 
text into a sequence of words. Wang, Zong, and Su (2012) find the character based generative 
model have better performance for in-vocabulary (IV) words (observed before) and character 
based discriminative approach is more robust for out-of-vocabulary (OOV) words. Brants, 
(2000) indicate Trigrams ‘n’ Tags (TnT) is an efficient statistical framework for the tested 
corpus. We employ the character based generative model to comply word segmentation due to 
the highest accuracy rate in the dataset.  
4.5.3 Text Classification Based on Naïve Bayesian Algorithm 
In this paper, the Naïve Bayesian algorithm is employed for text classification. We use 
segmented words as terms to create a term-document matrix that describes the frequency of 
terms that occur in the given document, rows correspond to the occurrence of terms in the 
document and columns correspond to terms. For instance, given two simple sentences “I love 
apples.” and “I hate apples.” The column of term-document matrix is “I”, “love”, “hate”, 
“apples”, the frequency of the term “I” is 1 for both sentences, “love” is 1 for the first sentence 
and 0 for the second sentence. Then we can reduce the sentences to a list of words (!) by 
frequency in the sentences. The aim is to classify the sentence into a specific category (") from 
a set of all predefined categories (positive, negative and neutral). Let {#$,… ,#' } be a 
predefined set of sentences with t features. Let () !  be the occurrence of  #) in document !, 
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we have the document vector ! = (($ ! ,… , (' ! . So the best category can be described as  "∗ = -./0-123("|!). Using Bayes’ theorem, the conditional probability is 
3 " ! = 3(!|")3(")3(!)  
Where 3(") is the prior probability of a category, 3(!|") is the prior probability that given 
document set is classified by a category.  3(!) is the prior probability that a given document 
set occurs. We assume all documents are independent, the problem is equivalent to: 
3 " ! = 3 " ∗ 3 #$ " ∗ … ∗ 3(#'|")3(!)  
Since we have three categories, 3(!) has no effect in "∗. It can be eliminated. The equation 
can be rewritten as follows: 3 " ! = 	3 " ∗ 3 #$ " ∗ … ∗ 3(#'|") 
And the document categorization algorithm is described as "∗ = -./0-12 " ∗ 3 #$ " ∗ … ∗ 3(#'|") 
The assumption is independence for each document that the probability of each word appearing 
in a document is unaffected by the presence or absence of each other word in the document. 
Although the conditional independence assumption is not true in the real case, the Naïve 
Bayesian algorithm has little effect on the results and still deliver accurate categorization 
(Lewis, N’edellec, and Rouveirol, 1998). Using Python code, we feed the pre-trained data 
provided by SnowNLP into the Bayes classifier and launch the training process. The measure 
of tone can be computed by predicting the probability of best category.  
 
4.5 Sample 
4.5.1 Prepare for data 
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Our sample contains data of non-financial main board firms listed on Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period from 2004 to 2012 from CSMAR database. CSMAR 
database has been used in research published in world leading journals. We select the period 
instead from 2002 because the amount of independent director reports disclosed increases 
largely after two year transition period.24 Reports with disagree opinions (around 400) are 
excluded, which already indicate the “strongest” negative tone, yielded 23984 reports from 
2004 to 2012. We generate the tone for each reports (Tone_each) that is a continuous variable, 
ranged from 0 to 1- negative view to positive and 0.5 means neutral. The average tone is 0.458 
which is slightly negative (median 0.447) about future (proposals) in Panel A-Table 1. The 
slight negative sentiment is common in corporate formal disclose, for example, Li (2010) 
documents that the sentiment of the CEO forward-looking statement in management discussion 
and analysis of 10-K and 10-Q in the US. 
For firm i with k reports in year t, we define its annual tone (Tone_year) as the average tone 
of all the reports in a firm by the learning algorithm: 
78(9_;9-.),' = 	 1=	 78(9_9-"ℎ),?,'@?A$  
 
 78(9_;9-.),'  is created as the observations to with financial data yearly to test whether the tone 
of IDRs predicts future performance. The annual average tone is 0.463, similar with the 
individual tone. Then we define variable “positive tone”, an indicator, equals one when the 
                                                
24 The Information Disclosure Standards (CSRC, 2005) further clarified the disclosure requirements, improving 
the quality and quantity of the reports. After 2005, the number of independent directors’ reports increased 
accordingly. In the same time, the “Code of information disclosure for listed firms: Annual reports” (2004) 
enhance the timely disclosure of IDRs.  
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annual average tone for a firm is greater than 0.7, zero otherwise. Correspondingly, “negative 
tone” is a dummy variable, taking one when the annual average tone for a firm is smaller than 
0.3, zero otherwise. The number of reports with negative tone (27.6%) is more than that of 
ones with positive tone (20.1%).  
 Financial and corporate governance data were also obtained from the CSMAR. To mitigate 
the influence of extreme values, all firm level data were winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
The final dataset includes 1437 firms and 11249 firm year observations.  
 
 
Figure 1. Trends of the tone and number of reports and firm performance. 
The figure shows trends of features of independent directors reports and firm performance (ROA) over 
the period of 2004 – 2012. The tone of independent director report (annual mean) is a continuous 
variable, ranged from 0 to 1- negative view to positive and 0.5 means neutral. The number of reports is 
annual average of reports issued. ROA is annual average of corporate net income divided by total assets 
times 10 in order to see trend clearly.  
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Table 1  
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
This table shows all the descriptive statics and definitions of main variables for the sample of non-financial main board listed firm in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock exchange over the period 2004 to 2012. 
 
Panel A The Tone of independent director’ reports 
 Definition Obs. Mean Median S.D. p5 p95 
Tone_each The tone of report[s], a continuous variable, ranged from 0 to 1 from negative view to positive; 0.5 means neutral 23984 0.458 0.475 0.447 0 1 
Tone_year The average of tones of reports in a firm  11249 0.463 0.500 0.303 0 1 
Positive tone Indicator variable takes one when tone_year is larger than 0.7 11249 0.201 0 0.401 0 1 
Negative tone Dummy variable, equals to one when tone_year is smaller than 0.3 11249 0.276 0 0.447 0 1 
        
Panel B Independent directors’ characteristics 
 Definition 
No. of 
firms Mean Median S.D. p5 p95 
Age The average age of independent directors in a firm 1437 51.755 51.333 6.258 42.000 63.000 
Age_outside Log value of Age 1437 3.939 3.938 0.121 3.738 4.143 
Pay (1000 RMB) The average monetary compensation of independent directors in a firm 1437 48 45 28.32 15 100 
Pay_outside Log value of Pay 1437 10.664 10.714 0.548 9.798 11.513 
% female_outside Ratio of women in independent directors 1437 0.138 0 0.199 0 0.5 
Directorships_outside The number of directorships 1437 1.893 1.714 0.786 1 3 
Education_outside The education level:5- Ph.D., 4-Master, 3-Bachelor, 2-College and 1-High School and lower 1437 4.025 4 0.656 3 5 
Financial expert Dummy variable, equals to 1 when a firm has at least one financial expert 1437 0.283 0 0.451 0 1 
Law expert Indicator variable, takes 1 when a firm has at least one law expert 1437 0.360 0 0.480 0 1 
        
Panel C Board features 
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 Definition 
No. of 
firms Mean Median S.D. p5 p95 
Age_board The average age of director 1437 49.166 49.222 3.885 42.800 55.444 
# female The number of female directors 1437 1.037 1 1.069 0 3 
Board size The number of directors 1437 9.350 9 1.914 7 13 
Table 1  
continued        
% independence The share of independent director on board 1437 0.355 0.333 0.046 0.308 0.444 
Number of 
committees The number of committees 1437 3.349 4 1.369 0 4 
Meeting frequency The number of board meetings 1437 8.737 8 3.718 4 16 
        
Panel D Firm performance and characteristics 
  
No. of 
firms Mean Median S.D. p5 p95 
Log (total assets) Log value of total assets 1437 21.641 21.536 1.117 20.024 23.694 
SOE Dummy variable equals to one when firm is controlled by state agent or state enterprises 1437 0.72 1 0.449 0 1 
ROA (%) The ratio of net income to total assets 1437 2.66 2.81 5.8 -7.5 10.72 
Leverage Debt over total assets 1437 0.524 0.527 0.236 0.185 0.819 
Largest Share The percentage of share held by largest shareholder 1437 37.744 35.897 15.03 16.148 63.74 
Largest1to2 The ratio of share owned by largest over second largest 1437 24.820 6.220 62.220 1.130 101 
Tobin’s Q Firm market value divided by firm value 1437 1.487 1.122 1.221 0.383 3.854 
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4.5.2 Descriptive Statistics for main variables 
Figure 1 shows trend of the tone and number of reports and firm performance over the period 
from 2004-2012: the primary axis is for the tone – solid line and firm performance 
(ROA*10)25– dash-dot line; the secondary axis is for the number of report – Dash line. It 
represents that the number of IDRs per firm year is around 2 to 3.5. The tone at year 2004 and 
2005 is more negative than ones at other periods, which is matching poor firm performance 
around 2004-2005. Trends of ROA and tone seem to have some similarity.  
 Panel B in Table 1 presents independent director’s characteristics. The average age of 
independent director is 51.8 years, which is significant larger than the average age (49.2 in 
Panel C) of entire board by t-test. Annual payment is 48, 000 RMB (around 4,800 GBP). 
Females only account for 13.8% in independent directors. Almost one third of independent 
directors have working experiences in accounting and finance area (or law area).   
 Table 1 – Panel C and Panel D demonstrates board and firm features respectively. Generally, 
a board of a Chinese listed firm has 9 directors with one female, one third of who are 
independent directors. It has three committees and holds 9 meetings per year. 70% of listed 
firms are controlled or strong influenced by state, state agents or SOEs. 
 
4.6 Model Design 
4.6.1 Model (1): Examine the relationship between firm performance and the tone of IDRs 
                                                
25 Corporate ROA is around 0.5% to 4.1%, to compare it with the tone of reports that ranges from 0 to 1, ROA in 
the figure has been multiple by 10. 
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To examine whether the tone of IDRs predict future performance, we apply panel data 
analysis with firm, year, industry fixed effects using the following model: 
 !"#$%&#'(#$)*+&,,. = 0(*&_2&)#,,.34 + 6(*7#(89,..34        (1) 
 
Where !"#$%&#'(#$)*+&,,. is measured as return on assets (ROA). The independent variable is 0(*&_2&)#,,.34 capturing the annual average tone of all the IDRs in firm i at year t-1. Independent 
and executive board members are a group to make business decisions, we control the board 
characteristics for capturing the factors that could influence their work efficiency: age_board, 
#female, board size, % independence, number of committees and meeting frequency. Firm 
status (Log(total assets), ROA and Tobin’s Q), ownership structure (SOE, Largest Share and 
Largest1to2) and debtor’s interests (Leverage) are controlled in !"#$6(*7#(89,,.. The definitions 
of key variables are exhibited in Table 1.  
Fixed effects estimators are applied for mitigating the heteroscedasticity and endogeneity 
issues of omitted variables and measuring errors by control unobserved firm invariance 
influenced, and time trends using year dummies. To partly mitigate simultaneity endogeneity 
issue, we use lagged values of independent and control variables to facilitate causality. We also 
estimate this model using IV and GMM method to further identification in robustness check 
section.  
 
4.6.2 Model (2): Determinants of IDRs’ Tone 
Which factors affect the tone of independent director reports? An empirical examination 
linking the costs of independent directors and firm characteristics takes the following form: 
 0(*&_&)+ℎ,,<,. = 	>	?*@&A&*@&*7!&)7B#&9,,. + C	D()#@6(*7(#89,,. + E	!"#$6(*7#(89,,.				(2) 
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Where 0(*&_&)+ℎ,,<,. is the tone of report k in firm i at year t. IndependentFeatures,,. is a vector of 
variables reflecting the features of independent director in firm i at time t. It mainly includes 
proxies for reputation concerns (Age_outside and Directorships_outside), the monitory 
incentive (Pay_outside), education and working experience (Education_outside and Financial/ 
Law expert). The empirical specification leads to omitted variable concerns, so our estimations 
apply firm, time and industry fixed effects are applied to control for firm and time heterogeneity 
polluting the coefficients of board characteristics to IDR’s tone.  
 
4.7 Empirical results 
4.7.1 The Relationship between Firm Performance and the Tone of IDRs 
In this section, we assess the implications of IDR’s tone created by Chinese word 
segmentation and Naïve Bayesian machine leaning algorithm for a firms’ future performance. 
We control the numeric financial information variables which have been explored in Chinese 
literature and documented to related to firm performance (e.g. Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009; Liu 
et al., 2015; Ma, Naughton, and Tian, 2010). Thus it is used to provide evidence that the tone 
contains information content beyond financial information in annual report. Table 2 reports the 
results of panel data regressions with firm and year fixed effects from 2004 to 2014 to test 
whether the tone of IDRs could predict future performance (Model 2).  The dependent variable 
is firm’s probability – ROA, and lagged value of explanatory variables are employed. Column 
(1) and (2) of Table includes the IDR’s tone and all the control variables, and Column (3) only 
involves control variables.  
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Table 2  
Regression results of firm performance on the tone of independent director reports 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Tone_year t-1 0.574*** 1.602***  
 (0.198) (0.379)  
Tone_year t-1 ´ SOE t-1  -1.446***  
  (0.402)  
Age_board t-1 0.027 0.029 0.028 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Female_board t-1 0.257*** 0.260*** 0.263*** 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) 
Financial expert t-1 0.085 0.093 0.085 
 (0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
Law expert t-1 -0.300 -0.287 -0.298 
 (0.210) (0.209) (0.209) 
Board size t-1 -0.040 -0.042 -0.038 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
% Independence t-1 5.594** 5.626** 5.652** 
 (2.269) (2.268) (2.268) 
Number of committees t-1 -0.015 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Meeting frequency t-1 0.029 0.028 0.031 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Log (total assets) t-1 -1.970*** -1.960*** -1.969*** 
 (0.226) (0.225) (0.226) 
SOE t-1 -0.938* -0.522 -0.948* 
 (0.539) (0.512) (0.542) 
Largest Share t-1 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Leverage t-1 -0.975 -0.911 -0.997 
 (0.914) (0.911) (0.917) 
Firm and Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 9.1% 9.3% 9.0% 
Observations 8866 8866 8866 
This table reports the results of panel data regressions with firm and year fixed effects from 
2004 to 2014 to test whether the tone of IDRs could predict future performance (Model 2).  The 
dependent variable is firm’s probability - ROA.  Column (1) and (2) of Table includes the 
IDR’s tone and all the control variables, and Column (3) only involves control variables.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
The coefficients of lagged tone_year in Column (1) and Column (2) are significantly 
positive, which indicates that the IDRs tone at least have one period prediction power. The 
coefficient magnitude is similar with that of CEO statement’s tone in the US (Li, 2010a). One 
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major concern for list SOE is that the particular ownership may alter business operation and 
manage/director motivations. Specially, top management and directors in SOEs are more likely 
to have political connections or pursuing political status improvement. Hence, we introduce 
the interaction of tone_year and SOE to capture the difference between SOEs and non-SOEs 
in the relationship of the IDR’s tone with firm performance in Column (2) of table 2. The 
coefficient of this interaction is negatively significant, which means that the tone in non-SOEs 
have higher prediction power than that in SOEs. Control variables have consistent sign and 
similar magnitudes coefficients in the models with and without tone_year variables. The 
coefficients of female_board and independence board are significant and positive, suggesting 
that more female directors and independent director on board are benefit for firm performance 
in line with literature (e.g. Liu et al., 2015).  Listed SOEs and firms with larger assets are more 
likely have lower profitability. Moreover, the share owned by largest shareholder positively 
associates with firm performance.  
We then substitute the tone_year with the positive_tone and the negative_tone indicator to 
estimate the relationship between the IDRs tone and future performance. Table 3 documents 
the regression results of firm performance on the positive_tone (Column - 1) and the negative 
tone (Column - 2) respectively. The positive_tone is positively related with firm performance, 
whereas the negative tone has a negative relationship with firm performance. The scale of 
coefficient of the negative tone in Column (2) is larger than the one of the positive tone in 
Column (1), which indicates that the negative tone contain more information content for 
predicting future performance. This may be because the key role of independent director’s key 
role is monitoring required by CSRC, so they tend to pay attention to whether firm decisions 
are made according to related legitimate requirement. To protect themselves using IDRs, they 
will care more about the negative impacts on firm performance. To compare whether negative 
and positive tone have the same predictor power, regressions with standardised variables are 
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also employed to further check. The results similarly remains. Generally, the results from Table 
2 and 3 support that there is a positive relationship between the IDR’s tone and one period 
future firm performance. 
 
Table 3  
Regression results of firm performance on the positive and negative tone 
 (1) (2) 
   
Positive tone t-1 0.291**  
 (0.122)  
Negative tone t-1  -0.334** 
  (0.138) 
Age_board t-1 0.028 0.028 
 (0.039) (0.039) 
Female_board t-1 0.263*** 0.256*** 
 (0.099) (0.099) 
Financial expert t-1 0.084 0.087 
 (0.208) (0.208) 
Law expert t-1 -0.298 -0.299 
 (0.210) (0.210) 
Board size t-1 -0.039 -0.041 
 (0.080) (0.080) 
% Independence t-1 5.616** 5.600** 
 (2.266) (2.269) 
Number of committees t-1 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.075) (0.075) 
Meeting frequency t-1 0.029 0.029 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Log (total assets) t-1 -1.972*** -1.964*** 
 (0.226) (0.226) 
SOE t-1 -0.946* -0.940* 
 (0.541) (0.540) 
Largest Share t-1 0.106*** 0.107*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Leverage t-1 -0.995 -0.988 
 (0.916) (0.914) 
Firm and Year dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 9.0% 9.1% 
Observations 8866 8866 
Table 4 documents the regression results of firm performance on positive_tone (Column - 1) 
and negative tone (Column - 2) respectively. Other variables are the same with ones used in 
Table 3. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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To examine whether the tone have prediction power more than one period, Table 4 reports 
regression results including one year lagged and two year lagged positive tone (Column - 1) 
and negative tone (Column – 2) of IDRs. They are regressed on the determinants of the tone 
and year- firm fixed effects. The lagged one period positive / negative tone has significant 
relationship with current firm performance. However, the coefficients of two year lagged tone 
are not significant and obviously smaller, although they have same sign with one year lagged 
value. We estimate the relationship between more year lagged tone and current performance, 
regressing on three and four lagged tone, the coefficients also are not significant and the scale 
is even more smaller (nearly zero). Therefore, the IDR’s tone is only related to one period 
future performance. It is reasonable based on the nature of independent director reports. 
Director’s monitoring in related party transactions (over half of meeting proposals) which only 
affect short term assets/debts and earnings.  
 
Table 4  
The IDR’s Tone and over one year firm performance  
 (1) (2) 
   %(9"7"T&	7(*&.34 0.278**  
 (0.139)  %(9"7"T&	7(*&.3U 0.033  
 (0.150)  V&W)7"T&	7(*&.34  -0.282** 
  (0.140) V&W)7"T&	7(*&.3U  -0.067 
  (0.122) 
Control variables Included Included 
Firm and year dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 9.0% 9.0% 
N 7645 7645 
Table 5 reports regression results including one year lagged and two year lagged positive tone (Column 
- 1) and negative tone (Column – 2) of IDRs. They are regressed on the determinants of the tone and 
year- firm fixed effects. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Overall, we find that the average of IDRs’ tone is positively correlated to future firm 
performance after controlling other factors that impact future performance. Hence, it shows 
that the tone includes information about firm performance, and tones are different in 
independent director’s report with “agreement” opinion. It also supports that our measure for 
the IDR’s tone is accurate. 
 
4.7.2 Determinants of IDRs’ Tone 
In this section, we investigate which factors have relationships with the tone of independent 
director’s reports at report level. Table 5 shows regression results with random effects based 
on model (1). The dependent variable is 0(*&_&)+ℎ,,<,. in Column (1) and (2), the sentiment for 
report k in firm i at year t, regressed on its hypothesized determinants discussed in 2.3.1. The 
dependent variable is negative_tone in Column (3), whereas positive_tone in Column (4). The 
results in Column (3) and (4) are coefficients using logit estimator. Column (1), (3) and (4) of 
Table 5 include all explanatory variables, and Column (2) contains board controls and firm 
controls.  We also estimate models with firm fixed effects, the untabalated results remain 
similar. Results with random effects are reported for two reasons: the result of Hausman test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random effects; in China, a huge 
proportion of listed firms (about 70%) are SOEs, this time invariant fundament difference may 
be related to the tone, which cannot be show in firm fixed effect models. 
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Table 5 Determinants of tone of independent director reports: director and firm level regressions 
 (1)Tone_each (2) Tone_each (3) negative (4) positive 
     
Age_outside -0.080**  0.382** -0.405** 
 (0.033)  (0.166) (0.171) 
Pay_outside 0.007  -0.042 0.009 
 (0.008)  (0.038) (0.038) 
%Female_outside -0.009  0.063 -0.056 
 (0.018)  (0.090) (0.092) 
Directorships_outside 0.001  -0.003 0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.011) (0.012) 
Education_outside -0.001  0.010 -0.022 
 (0.005)  (0.027) (0.028) 
Financial expert  -0.018**  0.103** -0.049 
 (0.008)  (0.042) (0.042) 
Law expert -0.001  -0.011 -0.005 
 (0.009)  (0.044) (0.045) 
Board size 0.003 0.002 -0.015 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.011) 
% Independence 0.114 0.084 -0.713* 0.474 
 (0.076) (0.073) (0.377) (0.383) 
Number of committees 0.009*** 0.008*** -0.047*** 0.048*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.017) 
Meeting frequency 0.002** 0.002** -0.001 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log (total assets) 0.001 -0.000 0.005 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.024) 
Account receivables 0.050 0.064 -0.236 0.266 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.212) (0.218) 
ROA 0.113 0.098 -0.329 0.722* 
 (0.074) (0.070) (0.367) (0.375) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 0.002 -0.014 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.016) 
SOE -0.025*** -0.028*** 0.089* -0.172*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.046) (0.046) 
Largest Share -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Largest1to2 -0.000 -0.000* 0.001 -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.091*** -0.079*** 0.397*** -0.375*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.117) (0.119) 
Firm, industry and year 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 5.42% 5.26%   
(Pseudo) R-squared   3.93% 3.65% 
Observations 22244 23855 22238 22241 
The table reports regression results with random effects based on model (1). The dependent variable is 0(*&_&)+ℎ,,<,.  in Column (1) and (2), the sentiment for report k in firm i at year t, regressed on its 
hypothesized determinants discussed in 2.3.1. The dependent variable is negative_tone in Column (3), 
whereas positive_tone in Column (4). The results in Column (3) and (4) are coefficients using logit 
estimator. Column (1), (3) and (4) of Table 2 include all explanatory variables, and Column (2) contains 
board controls and firm controls.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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 The tone of IDRs is influenced by independent director’s characteristics. The Adjusted R-
square in Column (1) is larger than the one in Column (2), indicating that modeling with 
independent director’s characteristics have higher explanatory power. The coefficient of 
independent directors age is negatively significant in Column (1) and (4), while positive in 
Column (3). Thus age of independent directors has positive relationship with the IDR’s tone. 
Younger independent directors are more (less) likely to issue reports with negative (positive) 
tone. It is consistent with our hypothesis that younger directors have more reputation concerns, 
so play a monitoring role more intensively. The coefficient of financial expert in Column (1) 
is significantly negative, while positive in Column (3), suggesting that independent directors 
with financial and accounting experience are more conservative when they issue reports, and 
have higher probability to issue negative reports. It supports the policy of adding financial 
expert on board to oversee firm risk.  
 In addition, several board and firm features impact the IDR’s tone. The coefficients of 
number of committees are significant in all the columns, positive in Column (1), (2) and (4) 
while negative in Column (3), which implies that board with more committees have more 
positive tone. One explanation could be boards with more committees work more efficiently, 
so they have more information and confident about the firm, so the IDR’s tone trend to be more 
positive. Another reason could be that the establishment of committees are not compulsory, so 
firms with more committees may have higher quality of corporate governance, and 
correspondently directors express more positive tone. Board activities, measured using meeting 
frequency, is positive associated with the tone (and the likelihood to obtain a positive report). 
However, the it is not related to the probability of receiving a report with negative tone. Ji et, 
al. (2006) shows that using meeting frequency cannot precisely capture board monitoring 
efforts, and Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui (2006) also point out that meeting frequency tends to 
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have a positive relationship with firm and manager frauds. We do not claim a causality 
relationship between the tone and meeting frequency using our model, because these two 
variables are simultaneously determinate by corporate governance factors. Moreover, SOEs 
have reports with less positive tone. The leverage ratio has a negative impact on the IDR’s tone, 
consistent with our hypothesis that firms with higher leverage ratio have higher bankrupt risk, 
so independent director will be more cautious to monitor firm operation and express less 
positive tone. 
 
4.8 The IDR’s Tone and the Necessities for Monitoring 
Is the positive association between the tone of reports and firm performance perceived for 
firms with high risk and more monitoring need? If the answer of this question is “Yes”, it does 
not only just deliver more evidence on the relationship, but provide important evidence that 
independent directors are not “passive” in their roles, in fact they acknowledge the issues in 
firms deeply. We hypothesis that the negative tone in poor performed or high risk firms 
contains “information” and significantly related to firm performance. To investigate this 
question, a sub-sample analyses are conducted where we attempt to separate between firms 
with relatively high and firms with relatively low monitoring needs. We expect that firms with 
higher liquidity risk (measured by Cash/short-term debt), greater bankruptcy risk (measured 
by total debt/ total assets) and poor performed are more likely to attract director’ attention than 
other firms, so the negative tone in this firms is more strongly connected with future 
performance.  
Table 6 reports regression results for each sub-sample. All regressions include the sets of 
control variables introduced in Section 4.2 with firm and year fixed effects. Panel A of Table 
6 shows results for poor, median and good performance firms, respectively in Column (1), (2) 
and (3). For each firm-year, we firstly calculate the difference between ROA and the average 
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industry return. Then we rank firm performance by the sum of the difference over the number 
operating periods. The poor performed firms are defined as the lower third, median performed 
ones are the middle third, good performed firms are the higher third. Panel B and C document 
results for firms with low and high liquidity - Column (1) and (2), and firms with low and high 
bankruptcy risk – Column (3) and Column (4). The industry average of liquidity and leverage 
ratio are used to divide firms into related sub-samples. The regression coefficients of the 
negative and positive tone are reported briefly.  
The results suggest that the negative relationships between the negative tone and firm future 
performance are observed for those firms that are likely to have more monitoring necessities 
from independent directors. These are the companies with poor performance, with above 
average leverage and with above average liquidity risk. However, the coefficients of the 
negative tone are insignificant in the sub-samples of companies with low monitoring 
necessities. Interestingly the coefficients of positive tone are not significant in all sub-samples 
except in good performed firms. This is because the reports of director report are required to 
disclose the proposal and their opinions, their responsibility is monitoring.  
Overall, the results in Table 6 provide strong support that directors recognize the issues in 
listed firms, and use their reports to express some concerns although the degree of concerns is 
not serves enough to issue disagree opinion to the public. 
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Table 6 The IDR’s Tone and The Necessities for Monitoring 
Panel A 
The predicting power of the IDR’s Tone in firms with Poor, Middle or Good Performance  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Poor performance Middle Good performance 
 ROA  
< Lower one third 
  Lower 1/3 
<ROA 
< Higher 1/3 
ROA 
 > Higher one third 
Negative tone t-1 -0.661**  0.008 
 (0.263)  (0.160) 
Positive tone t-1 -0.087  0.466*** 
 (0.343)  (0.173) 
Tone_year t-1  0.549***  
  (0.211)  
Control variables Included Included Included 
Firm and year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 11.7% 9.6% 11.5% 
N 2843 3004 3019 
 
Panel B 
The predicting power of the IDR’s Tone in firms with liquidity and bankruptcy risk levels 
 ROA     
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Liquidity > 
Mean 
Liquidity 
< Mean 
 Leverage < 
Mean 
Leverage 
> Mean 
Negative tone t-1 -0.234 -0.452**  -0.214 -0.372** 
 (0.161) (0.212)  (0.187) (0.180) 
Positive tone t-1 0.076 -0.023  0.219 -0.106 
 (0.154) (0.233)  (0.184) (0.193) 
Control variables Includes Includes  Includes Includes 
Firm and Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 6.5% 10.3%  5.8% 10.1% 
N 4330 4367  4209 4488 
Table 6 reports regression results for each sub-sample. All regressions include the sets of 
control variables introduced in Section 4.2 with firm and year fixed effects. Panel A of Table 
6 shows results for poor, median and good performance firms, respectively in Column (1), (2) 
and (3). For each firm-year, we firstly calculate the difference between ROA and the average 
industry return. Then we rank firm performance by the sum of the difference over the number 
operating periods. The poor performed firms are defined as the lower third, median performed 
ones are the middle third, good performed firms are the higher third. Panel B and C document 
results for firms with low and high liquidity - Column (1) and (2), and firms with low and high 
bankruptcy risk – Column (3) and Column (4). The industry average of liquidity and leverage 
ratio are used to divide firms into related sub-samples.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4.9 Robustness check 
From the trend in Figure 1, we can see that operations of Chinese listed firms are sluggish 
in 2004 and 2005 when the market was even worse than it in financial crisis around 2008. We 
also estimate using data over the period 2006 – 2012, the untabulated results do not alter. 
Some empirical literature on board diversity (e.g. Carter et al., 2003) suggest the diversity 
of director could enhance firm value by offering more monitoring and resources, so we include 
Hence, we examine whether the diversity of independent directors affect the tone of IDRs by 
including age, rumination, education and directorship diversity26 in the determinates of the 
IDR’s tone (Model 1). The main results are similar, and the coefficients of these variables are 
not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Diversity is measured by standard method, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
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Table 7  
Robustness check for the relationship between firm performance and tone of reports 
 Firm performance (ROA) 
  
Tone_year t-1 3.203* 
 (1.894) 
Age_board t-1 0.004 
 (0.023) 
Female_board t-1 -0.009 
 (0.072) 
Financial expert t-1 0.050 
 (0.169) 
Law expert t-1 0.121 
 (0.199) 
Board size t-1 -0.019 
 (0.038) 
% Independence t-1 -3.394 
 (2.171) 
Number of committees t-1 0.051 
 (0.058) 
Meeting frequency t-1 -0.027 
 (0.019) 
Log (total assets) t-1 0.712*** 
 (0.166) 
SOE t-1 -0.579*** 
 (0.176) 
Largest Share t-1 0.019** 
 (0.008) 
Leverage t-1 -6.176*** 
 (0.631) 
N 7644 %-value of LM statistic 0.105 
Cragg-Donald F statistic  224.052 %-value of Hansen J statistic 0.223 
Table 7 reports the results of regressing of firm future performance on the tone with IV-GMM estimator.  
industrial average board independence (one year lagged), the IDR’s tone (one year and two lagged 
value), and independent director’s age (one year lagged) are used as instruments. The regressions 
include the sets of control variables introduced in Section 4.2, errors are firm and year clustered. 
 
Although we do not claim the casualty effect that the tone of director report can improve 
the future performance, endogeneity issues are still a big concern. We use IV-GMM method 
for further identification robustness check (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2007; Wooldridge, 
2002). Following the literature about Chinese board (e.g. Liu, Uchida, and Yang, 2012), 
industry level of corporate governance factors could affect firm corporate governance, but will 
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not directly affect firm performance. Thus industrial average board independence (one year 
lagged), the IDR’s tone (one year and two lagged value), and independent director’s age (one 
year lagged) are used as instruments. Table 7 reports the regression results with IV-GMM 
estimator. The regressions include the sets of control variables introduced in Section 4.2, errors 
are firm and year clustered. The p-value of Hansen J statistic for over-identification test is 
24.02%larger than 10%, so we cannot reject the null the joint null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The p-value of LM statistic 
for under-identifying restrictions is larger than 10.5%, implies that instruments are correlated 
with the tone. The C-D statistic is 224.052, which is larger than 5% critical value of Stock and 
Yogo test statistic, which indicate that our instruments are not weakly identified. Therefore, 
our IV-GMM estimator is valid and the relationship between the tone and future performance 
is unchanged. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
This study analyzes the information content of independent director reports. These reports are 
proposed to disclosure independent director’s evaluation on important business decisions based 
on firm’s fundamentals. Whether these reports are informative is an open question. Although 
the content (narratives in reports) is based on the overall judgement of independent directors 
on the firm current and future operations, it might not be informative. Independent directors 
might be reluctant to indicate information about to which extent they agree or whether they 
have concerns. Especially directors mostly give agreement opinions when these concerns are 
not significant enough to let independent directors issue dissension opinions.  
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We employ Chinese word segmentation and Naïve Bayesian machine leaning algorithm to 
measure the tone of independent director report from more than 24, 000 records from 2004 to 
2012.  We find that the tone of IDRs is positively related to future performance. It has 
explanatory power incremental to other variables. The IDR’s tone is associated with 
independent director’s age, working expertise, the number of board committees, the board 
meeting frequency, state owned ownership and leverage ratio. We also argue that the negative 
tone of IDRs is negatively associated with firm performance for firms with greater monitoring 
necessities. Our findings are robust to a variety of robustness test. 
Our results suggest that boards of directors have private information on firm profitability. 
The directors have capability and willing to disclose their opinion if they have a proper channel. 
The director disclosure could be used by outside stakeholders to monitoring firm operation. It 
also could be a mechanism for inspecting boards of directors’ work diligence. 
More and more researchers become to focus on board behavior and interactions among 
themselves and with management. Most of these studies rely on interviews and survey data, so 
empirical study with large sample in response to director’s opinion or attitude is rare27 due to 
data availability. This paper is the first to analyze the independent director disclosure using a 
statistical learning methodology using a large sampleset. Empirical analyses in this studies are 
joint assessments of the economic hypotheses and machine learning method. Our results show 
that this statistical learning algorithm can be used to Chinese corporative disclosure, which 
could be useful for future research.
                                                
27 Studies that inspect board actions normally use extreme and clear specifications for board actions, for example, 
anti-takeovers (e.g. McWilliams & Sen, 1997) and CEO dismissals (e.g. Weisbach, 1988). Schwartz-Ziv and 
Weisbach (2013) observed board meetings of 11 Israeli firms and gain the private data on meeting minutes over 
period 2007-2009;  
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